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CHARLES DEMORE V. HYUNG JOON KIM:1  ANOTHER 
STEP AWAY FROM FULL DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Hyung Joon Kim lawfully immigrated to the United States with his 
family at the age of six, committed two crimes during his late 
adolescence, and was sentenced to three years in the California prison 
system.2  After he had served his time, the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS)3 took him into custody to await its decision 
of whether they would deport him to a country he had not been to since 
he was a young child.4  Kim languished in INS custody while he awaited 
this decision, not because he posed any risk of flight or danger, but 
because Congress had created an irrebuttable presumption that it is 
necessary to detain all aliens in Kim’s situation.5 
Due Process provides substantive protections such that the 
government must present a compelling governmental interest before it 
can infringe on our fundamental rights and it must narrowly tailor any 
such infringements.6  When the Supreme Court has addressed detention 
of citizens, it has required an individualized determination of their risk 
 
 1. Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003). 
 2. See infra notes 99-101 and accompanying text (discussing the background of Hyung Joon 
Kim’s case). 
 3. In 2002, Congress abolished the Immigration and Naturalization Service and transferred 
its functions to the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (BICS) within the Homeland 
Security Department.  Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296 § 451, 116 Stat. 2005 
(codified primarily at 6 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.).  For clarity and consistency, this note will refer to the 
INS and this new agency as the INS. 
 4. See infra notes 102-104 and accompanying text (discussing the INS’s involvement with 
Kim after his release from prison). 
 5. See Veronica Ascarrunz, The Due Process Implications of Mandatory Immigration 
Detention: Mandatory Detention of Criminal and Suspected Terrorists Aliens, 13 GEO. MASON U. 
CIV. RTS. L.J. 79 (2003) (noting that the validity of this irrebuttable presumption may rest on 
whether the groups to which the presumption applies are “sufficiently limited to include only 
individuals that are flight risks or potential threats to the public such that their detention is directly 
connected to the relevant government interests”).  See also infra notes 48-59 and accompanying text 
(reviewing the statutory history of mandatory detention of criminal aliens). 
 6. See infra notes 17-24 and accompanying text (reviewing due process protections). 
1
Smith: Charles Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2005
SMITH.DOC 12/17/2004  12:13 PM 
208 AKRON LAW REVIEW [38:207 
of flight and dangerousness.7  Rather than following this analysis in 
Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim, the Court held that Congress was not 
required to narrowly tailor its infringement of Kim’s fundamental rights 
because Kim was not a citizen.8 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Hyung Joon Kim will have a 
direct impact on a large number of aliens.9  For example, in 2002, the 
INS detained approximately 202,000 aliens, 103,000 of whom had 
criminal records.10  In this same year, the INS removed 148,619 aliens 
from the United States, 70,759 of whom the INS classified as criminal.11  
The Court’s decision also enters the murky area of changing due process 
protections for non-citizens, which may weaken protections for all.  As a 
whole, the Court explains what certain aliens are not entitled to, but 
leaves much unexplained.12 
Part II of this note traces the development of substantive due 
process protections for aliens, including general due process 
jurisprudence, the statutory authority for detaining criminal aliens, 
significant Supreme Court decisions, and approaches taken by the circuit 
courts.13  Part III examines the Supreme Court’s decision in Hyung Joon 
Kim.14  Part IV evaluates the due process analysis used by the Court and 
addresses the implications of this decision.15  Part V of this note 
concludes that the Court’s strained departure from strict scrutiny and its 
 
 7. See infra notes 30-38 and accompanying text (discussing pretrial detentions of criminal 
suspects). 
 8. See infra notes 189-192 and accompanying text (criticizing the Court’s departure from 
strict scrutiny analysis). 
 9. See Amy Langenfeld, Comment, Living in Limbo: Mandatory Detention of Immigrants 
Under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act of 1996, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1041, 1050-
52 (1999) (providing some discussion of the conditions that asylum-seekers and criminal aliens face 
while in detention).  Langenfeld discusses treatment of asylum-seekers and detained criminal aliens 
in the context of international obligations, due process protections, and separation of powers 
concerns.  Id. at 1044.  Her analysis of due process protections focuses on procedural due process 
protections.  Id. at 1057-60.  See also This American Life: Immigration (WBEZ Chicago radio 
broadcast, Oct. 13, 2000) (documenting the consequences of detaining aliens by interviewing aliens, 
an INS official, a congressman, and prison employees who worked with detainees), available at 
http://www.thislife.org/. 
 10. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 2002 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION 
STATISTICS 175 (2003) (reporting a variety of statistics for the INS, especially for the period 
between 1997 and 2002). 
 11. Id. at 177.  The number of aliens removed for criminal violations has increased from 
1,978 in 1986.  Id. at 176-77.  This number has continued to increase over the past several years 
such that there were 53,214 aliens removed for criminal violations in 1997, 60,965 in 1998, 70,186 
in 1999, 71,801 in 2000, and 71,994 in 2001.  Id. at 190-97. 
 12. See Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003). 
 13. See infra notes 17-98 and accompanying text. 
 14. See infra notes 99-162 and accompanying text. 
 15. See infra notes 163-262 and accompanying text. 
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failure to provide an adequate explanation of the departure will have 
implications for aliens, citizens, and future courts.16 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Due Process and Detention of Citizens 
The Due Process Clause17 provides protection in the form of both 
procedural due process18 and substantive due process.19  Substantive due 
 
 16. See infra notes 263-267 and accompanying text. 
 17. U.S. CONST. amend. V.  “No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law . . . .”  Id. 
[The liberty interest] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right 
of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to 
acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship 
God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those 
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness 
by free men. 
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (holding that a statute that prohibited the teaching of 
any foreign language to a child who has not passed the eighth grade was arbitrary). 
 18. Procedural due process requires a balancing of the individual interest, state interest, and 
probability that further procedural safeguards will reduce any risk of error.  Mathews v. Eldridge, 
424 U.S. 329, 334-35 (1976) (addressing the termination of social security disability benefits). 
More precisely, our prior decisions indicate that identification of the specific dictates of 
due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private 
interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, 
of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, 
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the 
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. 
Id.  Though this note will focus on substantive due process issues, there have been cases that have 
used procedural due process analysis to question detentions.  E.g., Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d 263, 273 
(6th Cir. 2003) (holding that additional process is not required for pre-deportation detention because 
it construed such detentions as not being indefinite and the INS had not made a showing of a strong 
special justification to extend the detention); Zavala v. Ridge, 310 F.Supp.2d 1071 (N.D. Cal. 2004) 
(reasoning that automatic stays, which override an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) decision to release an 
alien on bond, are unconstitutional because the liberty interest “is of the highest constitutional 
import,” the Government has not shown “an identified and articulable threat,” and overruling an IJ’s 
decision “poses a serious risk of error”); Ashley v. Ridge, 288 F.Supp.2d 662, 669-71 (D. N.J. 
2003) (finding detention of aliens during immigration proceedings without an individualized 
determination of flight risk or dangerousness violates procedural due process because the alien’s 
interest in being free from detention is “without question, a weighty one,” the government has 
proven no interest in keeping each particular alien detained, and the risk of error in unilateral 
determinations is great). 
 19. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 
U.S. 702, 719-20 (1997) (addressing a statute that banned assisted suicide and finding no 
fundamental interest).  “We have long recognized that the Amendment’s Due Process Clause, like 
its Fifth Amendment counterpart, guarantees more than fair process. The Clause also includes a 
substantive component that provides heightened protection against government interference with 
3
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process20 prohibits the government from infringing on a fundamental 
interest unless it has a compelling interest and the infringement is 
narrowly tailored (strict scrutiny).21  The Court identifies fundamental 
interests by identifying whether the interest is “deeply rooted in this 
Nation’s history and tradition . . . and implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were 
sacrificed.”22  If the interest at stake is not a fundamental interest,23 the 
 
certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.”  Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65. (internal quotation 
omitted.) 
 20. Justice Souter provided a thorough explanation of his view of the development of 
substantive due process analysis in Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 752-774 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 21. E.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (holding “that the asserted 
right to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due 
Process Clause.”) Id. at 727; Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 292 (1993) (explaining that the 
“substantive component . . . forbids the government to infringe certain ‘fundamental’ liberty 
interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to 
serve a compelling state interest”); United States  v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (finding liberty 
from detention a fundamental interest); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-64 (1973) (holding 
unconstitutional a statute that prohibited abortions except when necessary to save the life of the 
mother because the statute was not narrowly tailored when it infringed on a woman’s 
constitutionally protected right to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (recognizing a constitutionally protected right to privacy 
and finding unconstitutional a statute that prohibited counseling regarding the use of birth control 
because it infringed on the right of privacy in the marital relationship); but see Collins v. Harker 
Heights, 503 U.S. 115 (1992) (ruling that municipalities do not have a federal obligation under the 
Due Process clause to ensure safety and security in the workplace). 
 22. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997).  See also Moore v. City of East 
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (striking down a municipality housing ordinance under the 
Due Process Clause that denied the right for a non-nuclear family to live in one home); Rochin v. 
California, 342 U.S. 165, 169, 172-73 (1952) (asking whether conduct of the government “shocks 
the conscience” or “offend[s] a sense of justice”); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) 
(asking whether the interest is “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”); Snyder v. 
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (asking whether the interest is “so rooted in the traditions 
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental”). 
To begin substantive due process analysis, the Supreme Court also requires that those who 
claim a due process violation describe the interest carefully.  E.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721; 
Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993) (requiring “a careful description of the asserted right”); 
Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (stating that “[i]t is important . . . to focus on 
the allegations in the complaint to determine how petitioner describes the constitutional right at 
stake”). 
 23. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (reasoning that decisions about 
intimate choices about physical relationships is protected by due process, but seeming to apply 
rational basis review in finding that there was no legitimate state interest in prohibiting homosexual 
conduct); Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 799 (1997) (finding no fundamental right to assisted 
suicide); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (finding that there is no fundamental right for 
homosexuals to participate in sodomy), overruled by 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003); Schall v. Martin, 
467 U.S. 253 265 (1984) (holding that a juvenile’s interest in freedom from institutional restraints is 
substantial but not fundamental because juveniles “are always in some form of custody”); Stanley v. 
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (suggesting that a parent’s interest “in the companionship, care, 
custody, and management of his or her children” is fundamental). 
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Court will depart from this strict scrutiny and apply rational basis 
review, which asks whether the government’s end is legitimate and 
whether the means are rationally related to the end.24 
The Supreme Court has made clear that a person “may not be 
punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process 
of law.”25  This does not preclude, however, civil commitments that are 
not punitive.26  For civil commitments, “due process requires that the 
nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the 
purpose for which the individual is committed.”27  The government may 
commit a person only when there is a finding of future dangerousness 
and an additional factor such as mental illness “that makes it difficult, if 
not impossible, for the person to control his dangerous behavior.”28  The 
Court has also required states to meet at least a clear and convincing 
burden of proof for civil commitments.29 
The Supreme Court in United States v. Salerno upheld pretrial 
detention of criminal suspects against a due process challenge.30  The 
 
 24. See, e.g., Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997) (requiring the statue to bear “a rational 
relation to some legitimate end”); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997) (noting that, 
when there is not a fundamental liberty interest, the infringement on any remaining interest need 
only be “rationally related to legitimate government interests”). 
 25. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-39 (1979) (affirming the Mendoza-Martinez tests for 
punishment and holding that restrictions during pretrial detention that are “reasonably related to a 
legitimate governmental objective” are not alone punishment).  Accord Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 167 (1963) (reasoning that “punishment cannot be imposed without a prior 
criminal trial and all its incidents”). 
 26. E.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356 (1997) (observing that “[t]he Court has 
recognized that an individual’s constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint may 
be overridden even in the civil context”); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972) (holding that 
a state may not hold a person solely due to his incapacity to stand trial  unless “there is a substantial 
probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future” and “his continued 
commitment [is] justified by progress toward that goal”); Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 
366, 369 (1956) (upholding a statute that provided for the commitment of a person who is mentally 
incompetent to stand trial when the commitment is limited “until sanity is restored,” the person is no 
longer a danger, “or until suitable arrangements are made for the care of the prisoner by his State of 
residence”). 
 27. E.g., Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738.  See also supra note 26. 
 28. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 409-10 (2002) (noting that the impairment of volitional 
control need not be a complete lack of control, but instead “serious difficulty in controlling 
behavior”).  Accord Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997) (reasoning that the mental 
illness prong is not rigidly defined and a lack of volitional control due to pedophilia may satisfy this 
prong).  See also, e.g., Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1983) (holding that insanity 
aquittees may be detained beyond the time that they may have served if convicted of their 
underlying crimes); O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) (suggesting that detaining a 
person with a mental illness who can survive safely outside of detention would be analogous to 
“incarcerat[ing] all who are physically unattractive or socially eccentric”). 
 29. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432-33 (1979). 
 30. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).  Anthony Salerno and Vincent Cafaro 
5
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Court first questioned whether the detention was punishment by using a 
test that explains “[u]nless Congress expressly intended to impose 
punitive restrictions, the punitive/regulatory distinction turns on whether 
an alternative purpose to which the restriction may rationally be 
connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in 
relation to the alternative purpose assigned to it.”31  The Court found that 
this pretrial detention was regulatory rather than penal because Congress 
did not create it for the purpose of punishment and the limitations on it 
ensured that it was not “excessive in relation to the regulatory goal 
Congress sought to achieve.”32  Although the Court found the liberty 
 
brought a facial challenge against the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142, which permitted 
detention if “after a hearing . . . the judicial officer finds that no condition or combination of 
conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any 
other person and the community.”  Id. at 742 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3142(a) (2000)).  The Court 
noted that substantive due process protects against government conduct that shocks the conscious or 
interferes with rights implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.  Id. at 746 (citing Rochin v. 
California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) and quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 
(1937)). 
 31. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746-47 (citing Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 269 (1984); Bell v. 
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 (1979) (affirming the Mendoza-Martinez tests for punishment and 
holding that restrictions during pretrial detention that are “reasonably related to a legitimate 
governmental objective” are not alone punishment); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 
168-69 (1963) (reasoning that “punishment cannot be imposed without a prior criminal trial and all 
its incidents”).  See also Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997) (holding that, when the 
legislature labels the action as civil rather than penal, the Court “will reject the legislature’s 
manifest intent only where a party challenging the statute provides the clearest proof that the 
statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate the State’s intention to deem 
it civil”) (internal quotations omitted).  In Bell, the Court used the following test to determine 
whether an act is punitive.  Bell, 441 U.S. at 538. 
A court must decide whether the disability is imposed for the purpose of punishment or 
whether it is but an incident of some other legitimate governmental purpose. Absent a 
showing of an expressed intent to punish on the part of detention facility officials, that 
determination generally will turn on whether an alternative purpose to which the 
restriction may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears 
excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned to it. 
Id.  The Court has also looked at the following factors. 
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has 
historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding 
of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment—
retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, 
whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for 
it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned are all 
relevant to the inquiry, and may often point in differing directions. 
Bell, 441 U.S. at 537-38 (quoting Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-169). 
 32. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746-47 (1987).  The Court reasoned that Congress 
had intended this detention “as a potential solution to a pressing societal problem” and concluded 
that “[t]here is no doubt that preventing danger to the community is a legitimate regulatory goal.  Id. 
at 747.  To hold that the detention was not excessive, the Court relied on limitations such as 
application to only “the most serious crimes,” the detainee’s entitlement “to a prompt detention 
6
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interest to be fundamental,33 it determined that the government had a 
compelling interest in preventing crime by the detainees.34  Further, the 
Court concluded that Congress had narrowly tailored this detention35 
because the procedures were “specifically designed to further the 
accuracy” of the determination of likelihood of future dangerousness.36  
The importance of procedural safeguards has been applied in civil 
settings as well.37  In both situations, the Court has placed heavy reliance 
on the fact that there were individualized determinations before 
detention.38 
B.  Statutory Authority for Mandatory Detention of Criminal Aliens 
In 1907, Congress passed the first statute that authorized 
deportation of aliens for conduct that occurred after they came to the 
United States.39 The Immigration Act of 1917 excluded classes of aliens 
 
hearing,” as well as limited duration of the detention.  Id. 
 33. Id. at 750 (observing “the importance and fundamental nature of this right”).  “In our 
society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited 
exception.”  Id. at 755. 
 34. Id. at 749-50 (1987) (reasoning that the “interest in preventing crime by arrestees is both 
legitimate and compelling”). 
 35. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 749-50. (observing that the government was restricted in its 
implementation of pretrial detention to those who have had an adversarial hearing where the 
government has proven “by clear and convincing evidence that no conditions of release can 
reasonably assure the safety of the community or any person”). 
We think that Congress’ careful delineation of the circumstances under which detention 
will be permitted satisfies this standard.  When the Government proves by clear and 
convincing evidence that an arrestee presents an identified and articulable threat to an 
individual or the community, we believe that, consistent with the Due Process Clause, a 
court may disable the arrestee from executing that threat.  Under these circumstances, we 
cannot categorically state that pretrial detention “offends some principle of justice so 
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” 
Id. at 751. 
 36. Id. at 751-52.  The Court noted that the procedures included the right to counsel, the 
ability to testify and cross examine witnesses, enumerated factors for the trier to consider, a clear 
and convincing standard of proof, and written findings of fact.  Id.  The Fourth Amendment requires 
“a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty 
following arrest.”  Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) (requiring a timely judicial 
determination but rejecting the need for an adversary hearing). 
 37. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357-58 (1997).  “We have consistently upheld such 
involuntary commitment statutes provided the confinement takes place pursuant to proper 
procedures and evidentiary standards.”  Id. at 357.  The statute in question required commitment 
proceedings.  Id. 
 38. Id. at 357-58; Salerno, 481 U.S at 752.  “Given the legitimate and compelling regulatory 
purpose of the act and the procedural protections it offers, we conclude that the Act is not facially 
invalid under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”  Salerno, 481 U.S. at 752. 
 39. Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134, § 3, 34 Stat. 898, 900, amended by Act of Mar. 26, 1910, 
ch. 128, § 2, 36 Stat. 263, 265 (repealed 1917).  “Any alien woman or girl [found to be a 
7
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from admission to the United States, including aliens who had 
committed crimes of moral turpitude.40  The Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1952 (INA) excluded aliens convicted of illicit traffic 
in narcotics as well as aliens who had committed crimes of moral 
turpitude.41  Both acts contained provisions granting the Attorney 
General discretion to admit such aliens if they had been domiciled in the 
United States for at least seven years and were just returning from a 
temporary absence.42  Although Congress did not explicitly grant this 
discretion to the Attorney General for deportation proceedings, the 
courts interpreted it to apply.43 
In 1988, Congress provided for the deportation of aliens who were 
aggravated felons44 as well as their mandatory detention.45  After many 
district courts found this mandatory detention unconstitutional,46 
Congress amended the INA to allow for release of these aliens if they 
 
prostitute] . . . within three years after she shall have entered the United States, shall be deemed to 
be unlawfully within the United States and shall be deported . . . .”  Id.  See also Julie Anne Rah, 
Note, The Removal of Aliens Who Drink and Drive: Felony DWI as a Crime of Violence Under 18 
U.S.C. § 16(B), 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2109, 2114 (2002) (reviewing the history of immigration laws 
in the United States).  Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some 
Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1889, 1900-14 (2000) 
(tracing the development of immigration law as it relates to the distinction between civil and penal 
actions). 
 40. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 294 (2001) (citing the Act of Feb. 5, 1917, § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 
877 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 156 (1917) (repealed (1952)). 
 41. Id. (citing the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 202, 66 Stat. 163, 182-187) 
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2000)). 
 42. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, 39 Stat 874; 66 Stat. 212(c). 
 43. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 294-95 (citing In re L, 1 I. & N. Dec. 1, 2, 1940 WL 7544 (1940) and 
In re Silva, 16 I. & N. Dec. 26, 30, 1976 WL 32326 (1976)). 
 44. Anti Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (ADAA), Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7343(c), 102 Stat. 4471 (8 
U.S.C. § 1251(a) (transferred to 8 U.S.C. § 1227 as amended (2000)). 
 45. Id. at § 7342 (8 U.S.C.  § 1228 as amended (2000)). 
 46. E.g., Leader v. Blackman, 744 F.Supp. 500, 506, 507-09 (S.D. N.Y. 1990) (rejecting an 
equal protection challenge but holding that mandatory detention without a hearing violates 
substantive and procedural due process); Kellman v. INS, 750 F.Supp. 625, 627-28 (S.D. N.Y. 
1990) (holding that the denial to plaintiff of a meaningful bail determination, while in custody, is 
unconstitutional under the plaintiff’s due process rights); Probert v. INS, 750 F.Supp. 252, 256 
(E.D. Mich. 1990) (holding that “8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2) violates substantive and procedural due 
process” because “[i]t is shocking to the conscience and interferes with the rights implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty”); Paxton v. INS, 745 F.Supp. 1261, 1265 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (holding 
that mandatory detention pursuant to § 1252(a)(2) “is precisely the type of governmental conduct 
that shocks the conscience and interferes with the rights implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”); 
Agunobi v. Thornburgh, 745 F.Supp. 533 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (emphasizing the importance of the 
government’s interest in “ensuring that those aliens who should be deported are deported” but 
concluding that the lack of procedural safeguards violates due process).  Contra Davis v. Weiss, 749 
F.Supp. 47 (D.Conn. 1990); Morrobel v. Thornburgh, 744 F.Supp. 725 (E.D. Va. 1990).  See 
Martinez v. Greene, 28 F.Supp.2d 1275, 1279-80 (D.Colo.1998) (giving a history of statutory 
detention for criminal aliens). 
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were not a risk to the community and were likely to appear for their 
hearings.47  In April 1996, Congress again amended the INA to require 
mandatory detention of aliens convicted of an “aggravated felony.”48  
Five months later, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA),49 which replaced the 
aggravated felony provision with a broader mandatory detention 
provision for “criminal aliens.”50 
The broader criminal alien provision expands the types of crimes 
that subject aliens to mandatory pre-deportation detention.51  In addition 
to aggravated felonies,52 the provision requires mandatory pre-
deportation detention for aliens convicted of crimes involving moral 
turpitude with imprisonment of at least one year53 or multiple 
convictions,54 certain crimes involving controlled substances,55 certain 
firearm offenses,56 as well as certain other crimes.57  Furthermore, 
IIRIRA requires the Attorney General to take these aliens into custody58 
and to release them only under certain limited circumstances.59  
 
 47. Act of Nov. 29, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649 § 504(c) § 1252(a)(2)(B) (repealed); Act of 
Dec. 12, 1991, Pub. L. No. § 310(1) (8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) (repealed).  “The Attorney General 
shall release from custody an alien who is lawfully admitted for permanent residence on bond or 
such other conditions as the Attorney General may prescribe if the Attorney General determines that 
the alien is not a threat to the community and that the alien is likely to appear before any scheduled 
hearings.”  Id. (repealed by April 24, 1996 Act). 
 48. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 
110 Stat. 1214 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
 49. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. 
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009. 
 50. 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (2000). 
 51. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2000). 
 52. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2000).  “Any alien who is convicted of an aggravated 
felony at any time after admission is deportable.”  Id. 
 53. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (2000). 
 54. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2000).  “Any alien who at any time after admission is 
convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of 
criminal conduct, regardless of whether confined therefore and regardless of whether the 
convictions were in a single trial. . . .”  Id. 
 55. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B) (2000). 
 56. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C) (2000). 
 57. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2000). 
 58. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1) (2000).  “The Attorney General shall take into custody . . . .”  Id. 
(emphasis added). 
 59. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2) (2000). 
The Attorney General may release . . . only if the Attorney General decides . . . that 
release of the alien from custody is necessary to provide protection to a witness, a 
potential witness, a person cooperating with an investigation into major criminal activity, 
or an immediate family member or close associate of a witness, potential witness, or 
person cooperating with such an investigation, and the alien satisfies the Attorney 
General that the alien will not pose a danger to the safety or other persons or of property 
9
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Congress also limited judicial review of the discretionary judgment of 
the Attorney General and of his actions or decisions.60 
C.  Significant Supreme Court Decisions 
In 1952, the Supreme Court addressed the detention of aliens 
without bail during deportation proceedings in the context of the Cold 
War in the case of Carlson v. Landon.61  Under the authority of the 
Internal Security Act of 1950,62 five individuals were detained due to 
their connections with communist activities.63  Although the Court held 
that it was clearly within Congress’ plenary power64 to expel aliens who 
had not achieved citizenship,65 the Court also clearly held that this power 
 
and is likely to appear for any scheduled proceeding. . . . 
Id. 
 60. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) (2000). 
The Attorney General’s discretionary judgment regarding the application of this section 
shall not be subject to review.  No court may set aside any action or decision by the 
Attorney General under this section regarding the detention or release of any alien or the 
grant, revocation, or denial of bond or parole. 
Id. 
 61. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 543 (1952) (holding that “[t]here is no denial of the due 
process of the Fifth Amendment under circumstances where there is reasonable apprehension of 
hurt from aliens charged with a philosophy of violence against the Government.”). 
 62. Internal Security Act of 1950, §§ 22-23, 64 Stat. 987 (repealed 1971).  The act gave the 
Attorney General discretion to detain, “[p]ending final determination of the deportability,” aliens 
“who seek to enter the United States whether solely, principally, or incidentally, to engage in 
activities which would be prejudicial to the public interest, or would endanger the welfare or safety 
of the United States.”  Id. at § 22.  The Act also provided for detention and deportation of 
anarchists, aliens who advocated or taught opposition to all organized government, aliens who were 
members of the Communist Party or Communist Political Association, and certain other aliens.  Id. 
 63. Carlson, 342 U.S. at 528-31.  This was a consolidation of two cases, the first of which 
involved detention of four individuals for whom it was claimed that “release would be prejudicial to 
the public interest and would endanger the welfare and safety of the United States.”  Id. at 529.  
This assertion was predicated on evidence that each person had been a member of the Communist 
Party of the United States and had participated in the “indoctrination of others to the prejudice of the 
public interest.”  Id. at 530.  The second case involved the detention of Zydok, who was also 
claimed to be member of the Communist Party.  Id. 
 64. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.  “The Congress shall have Power . . . To establish an uniform 
Rule of Naturalization . . . .”  Id. 
 65. Carlson, 342 U.S. at 534-37.  While noting that this plenary power included the power to 
deport for communist membership alone, the Court endorsed Congress’ purpose of the legislation.  
Id. at 535 n.21. 
The communist movement in the United States is an organization numbering thousands 
of adherents, rigidly and ruthlessly disciplined. . . .  The Communist organization . . . 
present[s] a clear and present danger to the security of the United States and to the 
existence of free American institutions, and make it necessary that Congress, in order to 
provide for the common defense, to preserve the sovereignty of the United States as an 
independent nation, and to guarantee to each State a republican form of government, 
enact appropriate legislation recognizing the existence of such world-wide conspiracy 
10
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was subject to judicial review “under the ‘paramount law of the 
constitution.’”66  Although the Attorney General’s discretion was subject 
to judicial review, the Court concluded that it would override that 
discretion only “where it is clearly shown that it was without a 
reasonable foundation.”67  The Court did not require criminal procedural 
protections because it found that deportation was “not a criminal 
proceeding and has never been held to be punishment.”68  Due process 
was satisfied because “evidence of membership plus personal activity in 
supporting and extending the [Communist] Party’s philosophy 
concerning violence gives adequate ground for detention.”69 
The Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of indefinite 
 
and designed to prevent it from accomplishing its purpose in the United States. 
Id. (quoting The Internal Security Act of 1950, § 2(15), 64 Stat. 987 (repealed 1971)). 
 66. Carlson, 342 U.S. at 537.  The Court cited for support Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 
276 (1922) (holding that residents who claim to be citizens are entitled to due process protection 
during deportation proceedings); Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U.S. 272 (1912) (applying constitutional 
guarantees but finding that immigration proceedings are not criminal proceedings); Kaoru 
Yamataya v. Fisher (“The Japanese Immigrant Case”), 189 U.S. 86 (1903) (holding that aliens must 
be afforded due process protections when administrative officials are executing immigration 
statutes); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (holding that the protections of the 
Fifth and Sixth Amendments extend to all persons within the territory of the United States); Fong 
Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893) (noting that, although it was within Congress’ 
power to expel or exclude aliens, the manner which is taken to execute this power is still subject to 
review under the Constitution); and Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892) (holding 
that determinations of an administrative official regarding the admissibility of aliens who have not 
been naturalized and have not been domiciled or resided in the United States satisfies due process of 
law).  Carlson, 342 U.S. at 537. 
 67. Carlson, 342 U.S. at 540-41.  The Government did not argue that the Attorney General’s 
discretion should not be subject to judicial review.  Id. at 540. 
 68. Id. at 537.  Accord Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491 
(1999). 
While the consequences of deportation may assuredly be grave, they are not imposed as 
a punishment. . . .  Even when deportation is sought because of some act the alien has 
committed, in principle the alien is not being punished for that act (criminal charges may 
be available for that separate purpose) but is merely being held to the terms under which 
he was admitted.  And in all cases, deportation is necessary in order to bring to an end an 
ongoing violation of United States law. 
Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. at 491.  But see Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, 
Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bade Cases, 113 
HARV. L. REV. 1889, 1908, 1929, 1935 (2000) (arguing “that deportation of legal permanent 
residents for criminal and other post-entry conduct is punishment” because it is analogous to 
banishment of citizens and noting that long incarcerations only lend further support to this 
argument). 
 69. Carlson, 342 U.S. at 541.  The Court noted that “specific acts of sabotage or incitement to 
subversive action” were not required, but then immediately noted that there was no evidence that all 
arrested aliens who had communist membership were denied bail.  Id. at 541-42.  In fact, the Court 
noted, a majority of aliens with communist membership had been allowed bail.  Id. at 542. 
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detention of aliens after removal orders in Zadvydas v. Davis.70  After 
examining the due process rights of aliens, the Court held that indefinite 
detention beyond the point when it is “reasonably necessary to bring 
[about] removal” was unconstitutional.71  This holding followed from 
the Court’s conclusion that “the Due Process Clause applies to all 
‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their 
presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”72 
D.  Prior Appellate Court Decisions 
The Seventh Circuit addressed the constitutionality of § 1226’s 
mandatory pre-deportation detention provision for criminal aliens73 in 
Parra v. Perryman.74  The court held that § 1226(e) barred review of 
“operational decisions” under § 1226, but it did not bar challenges to the 
statute itself.75  After concluding that Parra had no legal right to remain 
 
 70. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).  In the context of two cases, the Court 
considered the constitutionality of a statute (8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (2000)), which authorized the 
Attorney General to detain aliens indefinitely after an order for removal if the Attorney General 
determines the alien to be a risk or unlikely to comply with the removal order.  Id. at 682.  The first 
case involved Zadvydas, who was born to Lithuanian parents while they were in Germany in 1948 
and immigrated to the U.S. when he was eight  Id. at 684.  Due to his criminal record, the INS took 
him into custody and ordered him deported to Germany in 1994.  Id.  Neither Germany nor 
Lithuania agreed to accept him.  Id.  He filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in 1995, 
challenging his continued detention.  Id. A Federal District Court ordered him released; however, 
the Fifth Circuit reversed.  Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 684. 
The second case involved Kim Ho Ma, who had been born in Cambodia.  Id. at 685.  The 
INS ordered Ma removed but he remained in custody because the U.S. had no repatriation treaty 
with Cambodia and the INS had concerns that he would be violent or violate his conditions of 
release.  Id. at 685-86.  The District Court ordered Ma released and the Ninth Circuit Court 
affirmed.  Id. at 686 (citing Kim Ho Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
Before addressing the merits of the claims, the Court concluded that habeas corpus 
proceedings remained available to challenge post-removal-period detention.  Id. at 688.  Justice 
Breyer, writing for the Court, held that “once removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, 
continued detention is no longer authorized by the statute.”  Id. at 699.  The Court allowed a six-
month period during which there would be a presumption that removal was reasonably foreseeable.  
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.  If, after this period, an “alien provides good reason to believe that there 
is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must 
respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.”  Id. 
 71. Id. at 689. 
 72. Id. at 694. 
 73. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2000). 
 74. Parra v. Perryman, 172 F.3d 954 (7th Cir. 1999).  Manuel Parra was convicted of 
aggravated sexual assault in 1996 and the INS took him into custody on December 7, 1998 pending 
his removal proceedings.  Id. at 955.  On March 3, 1999, an immigration judge determined that 
Parra was deportable.  Id. at 956.  Because Parra wanted to be at home with his three children who 
are U.S. citizens, he sought a writ of habeas corpus.  Id.  The Department of Justice responded with 
concerns that Parra would “go into hiding in order to stay in the United States indefinitely.”  Id. 
 75. Id. at 957.  The court reasoned that § 1226(e) precluded judicial review of the Attorney 
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in the United States,76 the court proceeded with procedural due process 
analysis by weighing the private interest, probability of error, and 
government’s interest in choosing not to provide additional safeguards.77  
The court narrowly defined Parra’s liberty interest as “liberty in the 
United States by someone no longer entitled to remain in this country.”78  
Further, the court reasoned that, because Parra conceded that he was 
removable, “the probability of error is zero.”79  Therefore, the court had 
little trouble holding that mandatory predetention of criminal aliens is 
“plainly within the power of Congress” and consistent with due 
process.80 
The Third Circuit came to a different conclusion in 2001 in Patel v. 
Zemski.81  First, the court cited Parra82 to hold that Congress had not 
restricted judicial review of the constitutionality of the act.83  It then 
concluded that the right to be free from physical restraint is a 
 
General’s decision to apply § 1226 as well as the Attorney General’s decision that Parra was 
ineligible for release.  Parra, 172 F.3d at 957.  The court went on, however, to state that this did not 
preclude review of the statute itself.  Id. (citing Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 316, 366-374 (1974)).  
The court was thus able to avoid the constitutionality of suspending the writ of habeas corpus in 
these circumstances.  Id. at 957. 
 76. Id. 
Parra’s legal right to remain in the United States has come to an end.  An alien in Parra’s 
position can withdraw his defense of the removal proceeding and return to his native 
land, thus ending his detention immediately.  He has the keys in his pocket.  A criminal 
alien who insists on postponing the inevitable has no constitutional right to remain at 
large during the ensuing delay, and the United States has a powerful interest in 
maintaining the detention in order to ensure that removal actually occurs. 
Id. 
 77. Id. at 958. 
 78. Parra, 172 F.3d  at 958. 
 79. Id.  The court pointed out that Parra did not argue in his petition for writ that he was 
entitled to remain in the United States.  Id. at 956. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Patel v. Zemski, 275 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 2001).  Vinodbhai Bholidas Patel, a citizen of 
India, came to the United States in 1984, became a lawful permanent resident in 1990, and had his 
application for naturalization approved by the INS in 1996.  Id. at 303.  Because he employed an 
alien and provided the alien with a place to live, Patel was convicted of harboring an undocumented 
alien on January 10, 2000.  Id. (noting that the conviction was for a violation of 8 U.S.C. § 
1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) (2001)).  Id.  On September 18, 2000, while Patel was serving a sentence of five 
months in prison and five months of in home probation, the INS charged that this conviction was an 
aggravated felony, subjecting Patel to removal.  Id.  The INS took Patel into custody when he was 
released from prison in January 2001.  Id.  Patel made an unsuccessful attempt to challenge the 
classification of his crime as an aggravated felony for the purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(N), 
appealed, and filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus while his appeal was pending.  Patel v. 
Zemski, 275 F.3d 299, 303-04 (3d Cir. 2001).  He remained in the INS’ custody at the time of this 
decision in December 2001.  Id. at 303.  Patel challenged mandatory detention as applied, claiming 
that both his substantive and procedural due process rights were violated.  Id. at 306-07. 
 82. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text. 
 83. Patel, 275 F.3d at 302. 
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fundamental right84 and applied strict scrutiny, which required “the 
statute’s infringement on that right [to be] narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling state interest.”85  The court held that due process did require 
an evaluation of the alien’s threat to the community and his risk of flight, 
which the mandatory detention provision did not afford.86 
The Tenth Circuit also held the mandatory detention provision of § 
1226 unconstitutional as applied in Phu Chang Hoang v. Comfort.87  
This court rejected the Seventh Circuit’s conclusion that aliens who are 
subject to § 1226 have forfeited their right to liberty88 and held that 
“[t]he liberty interest of a person who is detained pending deportation 
proceedings is . . . fundamental.”89  Though the court found the 
 
 84. Id. at 314.  Pursuant to Congress’ broad power over immigration and naturalization, it 
may make rules regarding aliens that it could not make regarding citizens; however, these rules 
remain subject to due process limitations.  Id. at 307-08.  The court reasoned that the Seventh 
Circuit had confused the merits of the alien’s removal proceedings with the question of whether the 
alien should be detained pending those proceedings.  Id. at 314.  See supra notes 76-80 and 
accompanying text (discussing the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Parra).  The court also noted that, 
while holding in Zadvydas considered the indefinite length of detention critical, Patel’s eleven-
month detention was lengthy.  Patel, 275 F.3d at 309 (pointing out that Patel’s detention by the INS 
was nearly twice as long as his detention for the substantive crime).  See also supra notes 70-72 
(discussing Zadvydas v. Davis). 
 85. Patel, 275 F.3d at 310. 
 86. Id.  at 311.  The court reasoned that the government’s objectives of preventing aliens from 
evading hearings and creating a danger justified detaining only those who presented such risks.  Id. 
at 312.  Because the aliens were already entitled to an initial hearing as to the merits, it would not be 
a great burden to incorporate into this hearing an individualized determination of risk of flight and 
danger.  Id. 
 87. Phu Chang Hoang v. Comfort, 282 F.3d 1247, 1261 (10th Cir. 2002), vacated, 123 S. Ct. 
1963, (2003).  The court reviewed the cases of Thanh Quoc Nguyen, Phu Chang Hoang, and Pham 
Qua Trung.  Id. at 1252.  Nguyen entered the United States at age 15 in 1991, pled guilty to a 
misdemeanor offense in 1999, was detained by the INS in about November 2000, and petitioned for 
his writ of habeas corpus in February 2001.  Id.  Hoang entered the United States at the age of 3 in 
1979, pled guilty to two counts of aggravated robbery in 1993, served eight and one-half years, was 
detained by the INS in November 2000, and petitioned for his writ in January 2001.  Id. at 1252-53.  
Trung entered the United States at the age of fifteen in 1987, pled guilty to two counts of forgery in 
2000, was detained by the INS in March 2001, and petitioned for his writ on April 27, 2001.  Id. at 
1253. 
 88. Id. at 1255-56.  The court relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Zadvydas for the 
proposition that, even after the INS orders aliens to be removed, they retain a liberty interest 
sufficient implicate due process protections.  Phu Chang Hoang, 282 F.3d at 1256 (citing Zadvydas 
v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001)).  The court reasoned that deportation “[a]liens who are lawful 
permanent residents of and are physically present in the United States are persons within the 
protection of the Fifth Amendment.”  Id. 
 89. Id. at 1257 (citing for support Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1387 
(10th Cir. 1981)).  The court reasoned that the liberty interest of aliens detained pending deportation 
proceedings is no less fundamental than the interest of a person detained pending a trial.  Id.  
(comparing these detentions to the detentions in United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750-51 
(1987)). While the court did recognize Congress’ plenary power over immigration, it found that 
Congress’ “implementation of this authority must comport with the Constitution.”  Id. at 1257.  The 
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government’s interests in ensuring attendance at deportation proceedings 
and “protecting the public from dangerous aliens” compelling, it found 
that § 1226 was not narrowly tailored because it created an irrebuttable 
presumption that all aliens who are subject to this section are flight risks 
and a danger to the public.90 
The Fourth Circuit considered a facial and an as-applied challenge91 
to the mandatory detention provision of § 1226 in the case of Welch v. 
Ashcroft.92  The court first rejected the facial challenge93 after it 
concluded that the right to be free from restraint during pre-deportation 
hearings was not a fundamental right.94  It reasoned that § 1226 is not 
punitive and the government’s interests of reducing risk of flight and 
protecting the community were legitimate interests.95  Although the 
 
court found that this statute was a matter of implementation of Congress’ power, rather than “the 
political substantive decision of who is to be admitted or excluded.”  Id. at 1258. 
 90. Phu Chang Hoang, 282 F.3d at 1259.  The court reasoned that, even though Congress 
may have found that many aliens did not appear for their proceedings, this “risk of flight posed by 
some criminal aliens [was] insufficient to justify the mandatory detention of all aliens who meet the 
criteria under [§ 1226].”  Id. at 1259-60.  In addition, the crimes that subject aliens to mandatory 
detention are not limited to dangerous offenses, so it was inappropriate to assume that all of these 
aliens were dangerous.  Id. at 1260.  Further, the court noted that in the three cases it was reviewing, 
the district court had ordered bond hearings, and in each case, the alien was released after an 
individualized determination.  Id. 
 91. Welch v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 213, 228 (4th Cir. 2002), overruled by Demore v. Hyung 
Joon Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003).  ‘‘A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most 
difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of 
circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.’’  Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745. 
 92. Welch v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 213, 228 (4th Cir. 2002), overruled by Demore v. Hyung 
Joon Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003).  Ricardo Antonio Welch, Jr. became a legal permanent resident at 
age ten.  Id. at 215.  In the same year that Welch was honorably discharged from service in the 
Unite States Navy and Navy Reserves, he pled guilty to four felony counts.  Id.  After the INS 
ordered him removed and took him into custody, a state court vacated his felonies.  Id. at 216.  As 
part of a plea bargain, Welch then pled guilty to six misdemeanor charges of simple assault and one 
misdemeanor charge of illegally carrying or wearing a handgun.  Id.  The INS continued to detain 
Welch, though it changed its basis to his misdemeanor firearm conviction.  Id. 
 93. Welch, 293 F.3d at 224. 
 94. Id..  The court explained that the Supreme Court in Salerno described the liberty interest 
involved in being free from physical restraint as being of a “fundamental nature,” but it did not 
explicitly state that pretrial detention is a fundamental right.  Id. at 221 (quoting United States v. 
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987)).  Further, the Welch court found that “the Supreme Court has 
never added freedom from incarceration to the short list of fundamental rights.”  Id. 
 95. Id. at 222-23.  The court reasoned that, because a fundamental liberty interest was not 
implicated, a two-prong test should apply.  Id. at 222.  “First, such detention must be reasonably 
related to legitimate government interests.  Second, it is axiomatic that due process requires that a 
pretrial detainee not be punished.’’ Id. (internal quotations omitted).  To determine whether 
detention is punitive, the court evaluated whether there was an express intent to punish and, if not, 
was there “no purpose other than punishment, or is [it] excessive in light of its goals.”  Id. (citing 
Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 269 (1984) for this standard).  The court reasoned that 
“[d]eportation itself is not punitive” so § 1226 was not punitive on its face.  Id.  It then concluded 
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court reasoned that it could not uphold a facial challenge to § 1226,96 it 
did find that § 1226 was unconstitutional as applied to Welch.97  It 
reasoned that there was little support to conclude that Welch posed a 
flight risk or a danger and it concluded that his fourteen months’ 
incarceration fell “outside any range that comports with due process in 
these circumstances.”98 
III.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A.  Statement of Facts 
Hyung Joon Kim (“Kim”), a citizen of Korea, entered the United 
States on March 10, 1984 at the age of six and became a legal permanent 
resident of the United States on March 28, 1986.99  In 1996, at the age of 
18, Kim was convicted of first-degree burglary in state court in 
California.100  Two years later, Kim was convicted of petty theft with 
 
that the government’s interest in reducing flight of aliens and providing for the safety of the 
community from dangerous aliens were both legitimate interests.  Id. at 222-223. 
 96. Welch, 293 F.3d at 224.  The court noted that the underlying criminal convictions were 
subject to due process protections and that aliens should be aware that committing crimes “may 
subject them to drastic and unwelcome consequences above and beyond mere judicial punishment, 
up to and including removal.”  Id. at 223-24.  The court also discussed challenges that the 
government faces when “dealing with aliens” and Congress’ plenary power regarding immigration.  
Id. at 224.  The court concluded that § 1226 would not “violate due process under every possible set 
of circumstances” and it was thus able to survive a facial challenge.  Id. 
 97. Id. at 227. 
 98. Welch, 293 F.3d at 227.  The court found that the only evidence of dangerousness was 
Welch’s record of misdemeanors, which did not support a finding that he was so dangerous that he 
should not be released.  Id. at 225-226.  The court reasoned that such misdemeanors were unlike 
aggravated felonies, which are “particularly serious crime[s].”  Id at 226.  To determine whether 
Welch’s detention was excessive in relation to the goals of the statute, the court looked at such 
factors as “the nature of the deprivation,. . . the conditions of confinement,. . . the procedures 
afforded detainees prior to adjudication, . . . the justification for the continued detention. . . . [and] 
[t]he actual length of the detention.”  Id. (internal citations omitted).  Even though the court 
recognized that detention pending a removal order “features a clearly identifiable event marking 
completion of the detention period (i.e., issuance of a final order),” there is still “no clearly 
identifiable deadline by which that event must take place.”  Id.  Thus, the same concern with 
indefinite detention that arose in Zadvydas was implicated here.  Id. at 226.  In fact, the court noted 
that “Welch’s 14 months in detention is five months longer than the 90 day § 1231(a)(2) and six-
month Zadvydas limits combined.”  Welch, 293 F.3d at 226.  See also supra notes 70-72 for a 
discussion of Zadvydas v. Davis. 
 99. Hyung Joon Kim v. Schiltgen, No. C 99-2257 SI, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12511, at *1-2 
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 1999) (granting Kim’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus and ordering the 
government to provide a bail hearing), aff’d sub nom, Hyung Joon Kim v. Ziglar, 276 F.3d 523 
(2002), rev’d sub nom, Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003). 
 100. Hyung Joon Kim v. Schiltgen, No. C 99-2257 SI, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12511, at *2 
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 1999). 
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priors and sentenced to three years imprisonment.101  Pursuant to 8 
U.S.C. § 1226(c),102 the INS detained Kim on February 2, 1999, the day 
after he was released,103 and charged him with being deportable due to 
his convictions.104 
B.  Procedural History 
On May 17, 1999, Kim filed a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus,105 arguing that his detention without bail was a violation of the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.106  The United States 
District Court for the Northern District of California held that the 
mandatory detention provision of 8 U.S.C. § 236 was a violation of the 
substantive and procedural due process rights of criminal aliens and 
ordered the INS to provide Kim with an individualized bond hearing.107  
The INS released Kim on a $5,000 bond and appealed the judgment of 
the district court.108 
On January 9, 2002,109 the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit held that the no-bail provision of 8 U.S.C. § 236(c)(1) was 
constitutional on its face, though unconstitutional as applied.110  
Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s order requiring the INS 
to hold a bail hearing for Kim.111  The INS then petitioned for writ of 
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, which the Court granted 
on June 28, 2002.112 
 
 101. Ziglar v. Hyung Joon Kim, 276 F.3d 523, 526 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 102. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2000) provides that “[t]he Attorney General shall take into custody 
any alien who . . . (B) is deportable by reasons of having committed any offense covered in 
section. . . 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), (A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) of this title.” 
 103. Huung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. at 513. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2000) (granting statutory power to grant the writ).  Habeas corpus 
is defined as “[a] writ employed to bring a person before a court, most frequently to ensure that the 
party’s imprisonment or detention is not illegal.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY DELUXE 715 (7th ed. 
1999). 
 106. Ziglar, 276 F.3d at 526. 
 107. Hyung Joon Kim v. Schiltgen, No. C 99-2257 SI, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12511, at *29 
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 1999) (granting Kim’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus and ordering the 
government to provide a bail hearing), aff’d sub nom, Hyung Joon Kim v. Ziglar, 276 F.3d 523 
(2002), rev’d sub nom, Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003). 
 108. Ziglar, 276 F.3d at 526 (holding that “due process requires [the INS] to hold a bail 
hearing with reasonable promptness to determine whether the alien is a flight risk or a danger to the 
community”). 
 109. Id. at 523. 
 110. Id. at 539. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim, 536 U.S. 956 (2002) (granting certiorari). 
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C.  United States Supreme Court Decision 
1.  Did Congress Restrict Habeas Corpus Review? 
a.  Majority Opinion 
A splintered113 United States Supreme Court reversed the judgment 
of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.114  Chief Justice Rehnquist 
issued a two-part majority opinion, which only Justice Kennedy joined 
entirely,115 though he also wrote a brief concurring opinion.  In part I of 
the majority’s opinion, which Justices Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, 
Breyer, and Kennedy joined, the majority raised sua sponte 116 the issue 
of whether 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e)117 precluded review of Kim’s challenge of 
his detention.118  The majority explained that, for Congress to preclude 
habeas review, it must provide “a particularly clear statement” of such 
intent.119  The majority found no such explicit provision in § 1226(e).120 
 
 113. Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003).  The Justices filed five separate 
opinions, with only Justice Kennedy joining the majority opinion in its entirety.  Id. at 531-32.  
Three justices who joined in judgment filed an opinion written by Justice O’Connor, which 
disagreed with the majority’s holding that the Court had jurisdiction to hear the case.  Id. at 533-40.  
In two other opinions, one written by Justice Souter and one written by Justice Breyer, four other 
justices concurred with the majority’s holding that the Court had jurisdiction to hear the case, but 
dissented from the majority’s holding that mandatory detention without bail of criminal aliens 
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2000) did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.  Id. at 540-79. 
 114. Id. at 531-32. 
 115. Id. (Kennedy, J. concurring) 
 116. Sua sponte is defined as “[w]ithout prompting or suggestion; on its own motion.”  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY DELUXE 1437 (7th ed. 1999). 
 117. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) (2000).   
(e) Judicial Review.  The Attorney General’s discretionary judgment regarding the 
application of this section shall not be subject to review.  No court may set aside any 
action or decision by the Attorney General under this section regarding the detention or 
release of any alien or the grant, revocation, or denial of bond or parole. 
Id. 
 118. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. at 516.  Justice Kennedy’s “query . . . opened the morning’s 
colloquy between bench and bar with a clear curveball—neither the government’s filings nor those 
of the respondent were concerned with this aspect of judicial review.”  Supreme Court Refuses 
Detention Secrecy Case; Accepts Mariel Cuban’s Indefinite Detention Challenge; Upholds 
detention During Removal Proceedings, Interpreter Releases, Report and Analysis of Immigration 
and Nationality Law, 81 NO. 3 INTERPRETER RELEASES 73, 78 (2004).  Even though Justice 
Kennedy raised this issue during oral argument, he joined the majority’s opinion, which held that 
judicial review was not precluded.  Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. at 538. 
 119. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. at 516 (citing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 308-309 (2001)).  
In March 1996, Enrico St. Cyr was convicted of a crime that made him deportable.  St. Cyr, 533 
U.S. 293, 293 (2001).  Although this conviction occurred before enactment of the Effective Death 
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b.  Justice O’Connor Concurring in Part and Concurring in 
Judgment 
Justice O’Connor filed an opinion, which Justices Scalia and 
Thomas joined, that concurred in part and in judgment.121  This opinion 
expressed disagreement with the majority’s holding that the Court had 
jurisdiction to hear this case.122  Although she agreed with the majority’s 
standard of requiring a clear statement by Congress to repeal habeas 
jurisdiction,123 she read 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) to contain the requisite clear 
statement.124 
 
Penalty Act and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act, the Attorney 
General claimed these acts precluded him from using any discretion with regard to St. Cyr’s request 
for a waiver of deportation.  Id.  St. Cyr filed a habeas corpus petition, claiming that the 1996 acts 
did not apply to convictions that occurred before their enactment.  Id.  The District Court accepted 
his petition and found for him and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.  Id. 
In an opinion written by Justice Stevens, the Supreme Court held there is a “strong 
presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action” and required “a clear statement of 
congressional intent to repeal habeas jurisdiction.”  St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 298 (citing Ex parte Yerger, 
8 U.S. 85, 102 (Wall. 1869)).  The Court clarified that “[i]mplications from statutory text or 
legislative history are not sufficient to repeal habeas jurisdiction; instead, Congress must articulate 
specific and unambiguous statutory directives to effect repeal.” Id. at 299 (citing Yerger, 8 U.S. at 
105).  Applying this standard, the Court found that it was able to hold that the statute was not 
sufficiently clear, and thus able to avoid “a construction that would raise serious constitutional 
questions.” Id. at 314.  The Court went on to hold that elimination of the Attorney General’s 
discretion did not apply retroactively.  Id. at 326. 
 120. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. at 517.  The Court explained that “[s]ection 1226(e) contains 
no explicit provision barring habeas review, and we think that its clear text does not bar 
respondent’s constitutional challenge to the legislation authorizing his detention without bail.” Id.  
To come to this conclusion, the Court reasoned that the limitation on judicial review applied only to 
discretionary judgments, but Kim was challenging the statutory framework that permitted his 
detention without bail rather than any discretionary judgment.  Id.  See supra note 60 (giving the 
text of § 1226(e)). 
 121. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. at 533-40 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part). 
 122. Id. at 533 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part). 
 123. Id. at 533. 
 124. Id.  (O’Connor, J., concurring in part).  “It cannot seriously be maintained that the second 
sentence employs a term of art such that ‘no court’ does not really mean ‘no court,’ or that a 
decision of the Attorney General may not be ‘set aside’ in actions filed under the Immigration and 
Naturalization Act but may be set aside on habeas review.”  Id. at 535.  See supra note 60 for the 
text of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) (2000). 
QUESTION: Ms. Rabinovitz, do you have a response to the jurisdiction problem? I 
mean, it’s possible that despite the Government’s failure to raise it, that we could do so.  
And why doesn’t section 1226 tell the courts to keep hands off? 
MS. RABINOVITZ: Yes, Your Honor. We agree with the Solicitor General’s 
explanation for why this Court did not— 
QUESTION: I have to tell you I don’t understand it. I thought maybe you’d enlighten 
me there. 
(Laughter.) 
MS. RABINOVITZ: This—this statute contains no express language that repeals habeas 
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Justice O’Connor then evaluated whether this limitation on habeas 
corpus violated the Suspension Clause.125 126  Even though she provided 
an analysis of the Suspension Clause,127 she concluded that she “need 
not conclusively decide the thorny question whether 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) 
violates the Suspension Clause” because the majority determined there 
was jurisdiction.128 
 
jurisdiction. That’s one answer that I could give you, Your Honor, and based on this 
Court’s decision in St. Cyr and Calcano, absent that—that language, the habeas—there’s 
still jurisdiction in— 
QUESTION: How could that language not repeal habeas jurisdiction? No court may set 
aside any action by the Attorney General under this section. How can—how can that—I 
mean, what can you do in habeas corpus unless you’re setting aside action by the 
Attorney General under this section? How can that possibly not set aside habeas corpus? 
United States Supreme Court Official Transcript at 32-33, Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim, 123 S. Ct. 
1708 (2003) (No. 01-1491). 
 125. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.  “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be 
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.” Id. 
 126. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. 537-40 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part).  Justice O’Connor 
noted that “[t]he constitutionality of § 1226(e)’s limitation on habeas review therefore turns on 
whether the writ was generally available to those in respondent’s position in 1789 (or, possibly, 
thereafter) to challenge detention during removal proceedings.”  Id. at 537-38 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in part) (citing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001) and Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 
651, 663-664 (1996)).  She also noted that “until very recently, the writ was not generally available 
to aliens to challenge their detention while removal proceedings were ongoing.”  Id. at 539 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part). 
 127. Id. at 537-40 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part) (reasoning that “[t]he constitutionality of 
§ 1226(e)’s limitation on habeas review therefore turns on whether the writ was generally available 
to those in respondent’s position in 1789 (or, possibly, thereafter) to challenge detention during 
removal proceedings”). 
 128. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. at 540 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part).  The parties did not 
brief this issue.  United States Supreme Court Official Transcript at 62-63, Demore v. Hyung Joon 
Kim, 123 S. Ct. 1708 (2003) (No. 01-1491) (containing oral argument before the Supreme Court by 
Theodore B. Olson on behalf of the United States and Judy Rabinovitz on behalf of Hyung Joon 
Kim). 
QUESTION: General Olson, I don’t want to intrude upon your rebuttal time, but I have 
one question that’s very important for me and you can answer it yes or no. Assuming I 
disagree with you as to the reading of the statute as to whether there is jurisdiction in this 
case, if there is no jurisdiction, is that provision of the statute in the view of the 
Government unconstitutional? 
MR. OLSON: No. Now, we haven’t briefed and studied that and—and I have to rely on 
the answer that I gave before.  But I think that that would be a correct with—it would be 
within the power of Congress to do that under certain circumstances. 
QUESTION: Well, you can rely on the presumption of constitutionality if you haven’t 
briefed it. 
(Laughter.) 
MR. OLSON: Well, then I would’ve have to answer the question differently.  Well, if—I 
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2.  Does Mandatory Detention Violate the Due Process Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment? 
a.  Majority Opinion 
Part II of the majority opinion, which Justices O’Connor, Scalia, 
Thomas, and Kennedy joined, held that detention of “a criminal alien 
who has conceded that he is deportable, for the limited period of his 
removal proceedings” does not violate the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment.129  The majority began its analysis by evaluating the 
policy behind mandatory detention pending removal hearings130 and held 
that “[s]uch detention necessarily serves the purpose of preventing 
deportable criminal aliens from fleeing prior to or during their removal 
proceedings, thus increasing the chance that, if ordered removed, the 
aliens will be successfully removed.”131 
The majority noted that “[i]n the exercise of its broad power over 
naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that 
would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.”132  The majority also 
 
 129. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. at 530-33. 
 130. Id. at 516-22.  The majority found a “wholesale failure by the INS to deal with increasing 
rates of criminal activity by aliens.”  Id. at 518 (citing, for example, Criminal Aliens in the United 
States: Hearings Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on 
Governmental Affairs, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); S. REP. NO. 104-48, at 1 (1995)).  The majority 
also cited S. REP. NO. 104-249, at 7 (1996) (noting that “aliens who enter or remain in the United 
States in violation of our law are effectively taking immigration opportunities that might otherwise 
be extended to others.”), DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, 
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, DEPORTATION OF ALIENS AFTER FINAL ORDERS 
HAVE BEEN ISSUED, REP. NO. I-96-03 (Mar. 1996) (noting that the INS’ failure to detain aliens 
during deportation proceedings was a major cause of its failure to remove deportable criminal 
aliens), S. REP. NO. 104-48, at 23 (noting that limitations on funding and detention space affected 
release determinations when the Attorney General had broad discretion to conduct individualized 
bond hearings), and S. REP. NO. 104-48 at 2 (noting that more than twenty percent of deportable 
criminal aliens who the INS released failed to appear for their removal hearings).  Id. at 518-19. 
 131. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. at 527-28.  The Court also noted that Kim did not challenge 
the general authority of Congress to remove criminal aliens and had conceded that he was 
deportable.  Id. at 522-23.  The majority found the concession important because Kim did not 
receive the procedural protection provided under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) and the Court did not need to 
reach Kim’s argument that his petty theft crime did not qualify as an aggravated felony, which he 
brought up for the first time in his brief to the Supreme Court. Id. at 523 n.6. 
 132. Id. at 521 (citing Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976)).  For guidance on the 
constitutional rights of aliens, the majority looked to Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993) (reviewing the constitutional rights 
of juveniles during the deportation process); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 
(1990) (noting that aliens are entitled to constitutional protections when they are within the United 
States and have developed substantial connections with the United States); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 
787 (1977) (noting that the power to expel and exclude aliens is a power of the political branch and 
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looked to Carlson v. Landon133 and Reno v. Flores,134 which both upheld 
detention of aliens who were deportable.135  The majority distinguished 
the Court’s previous holding in Zadvydas v. Davis136 by noting that 
Zadvydas involved removal that was “no longer practically attainable” 
and the detention had no foreseeable termination.137  This case, however, 
involved pre-deportation detention, which the majority observed “lasts 
roughly a month and a half in the vast majority of cases in which [8 
U.S.C. § 1226] is invoked, and about five months in the minority of 
cases in which the alien chooses to appeal.”138  The majority reasoned 
that, while aliens are entitled to due process of law in deportation 
proceedings,139 Congress need not use the “least burdensome means to 
accomplish its goal” when dealing with deportable aliens.140  The 
majority upheld detention during such proceedings141 and rejected Kim’s 
claim.142 
b.  Justice Kennedy Concurs 
Justice Kennedy filed a brief concurring opinion in which he 
reasoned that “due process requires individualized procedures to ensure 
there is at least some merit to the [INS] charge and, therefore, sufficient 
justification to detain a lawful permanent resident alien143 pending a 
 
thus largely immune from judicial review); and Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) 
(noting that although aliens are entitled to certain constitutional protections, policy toward aliens is 
exclusively entrusted to the political branch and largely immune from judicial review). Id. at 521-
23. 
 133. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952).  Active members of the Communist Party may 
be detained without bail pending deportation.  Id. at 538.  The Court reasoned that, where Congress 
has granted the Attorney General the discretion of whether to grant bail during deportation hearings, 
the Attorney General’s decision “can only be overridden where it is clearly shown that it was 
without a reasonable foundation.”  Id. at 540-41 (internal quotations omitted).  See supra notes 61-
69 and accompanying text (reviewing Carlson). 
 134. Reno, 507 U.S. 292 (upholding the INS’ policy of releasing alien juveniles while 
deportation proceedings are pending only when there is a parent, legal guardian, or certain other 
adult relatives available to take the juveniles into their care). 
 135. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. at 523-26. 
 136. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text (reviewing the Zadvydas opinion) 
 137. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. at 527-31. 
 138. Id. at 530-31 (citing Brief for Petitioners at 39-40, Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim, 123 S. Ct. 
1708 (2003) (No. 01-1491)). 
 139. Id.  at 522 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993)). 
 140. Id.  at 528. 
 141. Id. at 522-23. 
 142. Id. at 532. 
 143. Permanent resident alien is defined as: 
[a]n alien admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident. . . .  Lawful 
permanent residents are legally accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the 
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more formal hearing.”144  He also concluded that the Due Process Clause 
might preclude detention if it becomes “unreasonable or unjustified.”145  
Kim, however, did have an opportunity to demonstrate that he was not 
properly included as a criminal alien, which satisfied the Due Process 
Clause.146 
c.  Justice Souter Concurs with Jurisdiction and Dissents with 
Merits 
Justice Souter filed an opinion, which Justices Stevens and 
Ginsburg joined, that concurred with the majority’s holding that the 
Court did have jurisdiction to hear this case, but dissented from the 
majority’s disposition on the merits.147  Justice Souter began by 
disagreeing with the majority’s conclusion148 that Kim had conceded his 
deportability.149  He reasoned that Kim was not able to raise the issue yet 
because Immigration Court had not yet held a hearing on Kim’s 
removability.150 
Justice Souter concluded that evaluation of mandatory detention 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) must begin with “the traditional doctrine 
concerning the Government’s physical confinement of individuals.”151  
 
United States.  They may be issued immigrant visas by the Department of State overseas 
or adjusted to permanent resident status by the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
in the United States. 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 2002 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 226 
(2003). 
 144. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. at 538-40  (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing his dissenting 
opinion in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 721 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) for support). 
 145. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 146. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).  See infra note 206 (describing the Joseph hearing). 
 147. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. at 540-76 (Souter, J., dissenting in part). 
 148. Id. at 523 n.6 (discussing the conclusion that Kim conceded he was deportable). 
 149. Id. at 540-43 (Souter, J., dissenting in part). 
 150. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting in part). 
 151. Id. at 542-47 (Souter, J., dissenting in part) (providing an extensive evaluation of 
precedent regarding the rights of lawful permanent residents).  See, e.g., Landon v. Placencia, 459 
U.S. 21 (1982) (discussing and distinguishing the rights of aliens residing in the United States 
during deportation proceedings with the rights of aliens who are denied admission to the United 
States in exclusion proceedings); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (noting that the Due Process 
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments provide protections to aliens from deprivation of 
life, liberty or property without due process of law); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (holding 
that a state’s exclusion of aliens from the practice of law violated the Equal Protection Clause); 
Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966) (discussing that resident aliens may have stronger ties to the 
United States than some who have become naturalized citizens); Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 
(1963) (holding that due process entitles an alien returning from a trip outside the United States to a 
hearing on the charges underlying an attempt to exclude him); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 
U.S. 590 (1953) (holding that aliens who lawfully enter and are residing in the United States are 
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Justice Souter relied on precedent152 to conclude that due process 
requires an individual determination before detention153 and therefore 
Kim’s detention “violate[d] both components of due process.”154 
d.  Justice Breyer also Concurring with Jurisdiction and 
Dissenting with Merits 
Justice Breyer filed an opinion that concurred in part and dissented 
 
entitled to rights guaranteed by the Constitution, including rights protected by the First Amendment, 
Fifth Amendment, and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Bridges v. Wixon, 
326 U.S. 135 (1945) (holding that aliens residing in the United States are accorded freedom of 
speech and of press); Kaoru Yamataya v. Fisher (“The Japanese Immigrant Case”), 189 U.S. 86 
(1903) (holding that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause gives aliens a right to challenge 
mistreatment of their person or property); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893) 
(holding that aliens residing in the United States are entitled to all of the protections of the 
Constitution even though they remain subject to Congress’s power to order expulsion or 
deportation); Lau Ow Bew v. United States, 144 U.S. 47 (1892) (discussing the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts to decide questions raised by aliens subject to the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, § 6, 
as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 265); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1839) (interpreting 
“the people” as used in the Fourth Amendment and noting that aliens are entitled to constitutional 
protections when they are within the United States and have developed substantial connections with 
the United States). 
 152. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. at 548-53 (Souter, J., dissenting in part).  Cases on which 
Justice Souter relied included Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993) (reviewing the constitutional 
rights of juveniles during the deportation process); Foucha v. Lousiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992) (holding 
that a state may confine a mentally ill person only if it shows by clear and convincing evidence that 
the person is both mentally ill and dangerous); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) 
(noting that “in our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the 
carefully limited exception.”); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (holding that the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires a clear and convincing standard of proof in 
civil commitment hearings for the purpose of involuntarily committing individuals to state mental 
hospitals); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (holding that a criminal defendant who is found 
to be incompetent to stand trial cannot be held more than a reasonable time to determine whether 
there is a substantial probability that he will attain capacity in the foreseeable future and he must 
then either be released subject to civil commitment proceedings or held as long as justified by 
progress toward capacity). 
 153. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. at 540-76 (Souter, J., dissenting in part). 
 154. Id. at 558 (Souter, J., dissenting in part).  Justice Souter addressed the majority’s effort to 
distinguish Zadvydas by arguing that, even though that case involved detention after a removal 
order, the same principles that limited post removal order detention also limit the power to detain 
pending deportation proceedings.  Id. at 560-62 (Souter, J., dissenting in part).  In addition, he 
questioned the majority’s interpretation of statistics supporting the need for detention, as well as the 
majority’s reliance on Carlson v. Landon and Reno v. Flores because those cases involved 
discretionary detention rather than mandatory detention.  Id. at 568-76 (Souter, J., dissenting in 
part).  Though he did not question the power to detain aliens to avoid flight or prevent danger to the 
community, he phrased the issue as “whether that power may be exercised by detaining a still lawful 
permanent resident alien when there is no reason for it and no way to challenge it.”  Id. at 576 
(Souter, J., dissenting in part).  So phrased, he found “[t]he Court’s holding that the Due Process 
Clause allows this under a blanket rule is devoid of even ostensible justification in fact and at odds 
with the settled standard of liberty.”  Id. 
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in part.155  He joined Part I of the majority’s opinion, which held that the 
court did have jurisdiction to decide this case.156  Although Justice 
Souter found that the INS could hold aliens who concede that they are 
deportable for a limited time without bail,157 he agreed with Justice 
Souter’s opinion that Kim had not conceded his deportability.158 
Justice Breyer analyzed the text of the statute to conclude that 
mandatory detention did not apply until an alien “is deportable.”159  
Until that is determined, and in the absence of other bail standards for 
aliens who are not yet deportable, he reasoned that the INS should apply 
the criminal justice system bail standards.160  He thus interpreted the 
statute to apply these bail standards to an alien whose claim that he is 
“not deportable is (1) not interposed solely for purposes of delay and (2) 
raises a question of ‘law or fact’ that is not insubstantial.”161  Because he 
found that Kim’s arguments were “neither insubstantial nor interposed 
solely for purposes of delay,” mandatory detention did not apply, and the 
Court should have remanded the case to apply the criminal justice bail 
standards.162 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
This note will focus on the Supreme Court’s departure in Demore v. 
Hyung Joon Kim from typical substantive due process analysis.  I will 
argue that the Court confused equal protection analysis with due process 
analysis and erred when it relied on statistics to dispense with 
individualized determinations of whether detention is necessary.163  This 
departure will impact aliens generally as well as the large population of 
 
 155. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. at 576-79 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 156. Id. at 576. 
 157. Id.  Justice Breyer reasoned that “an alien’s concession that he is deportable seems to me 
the rough equivalent of the entry of an order of removal.”  Id. at 576-77.  Time limits of the kind in 
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, would then apply.  Id. at 577-78 (Breyer, J., dissenting in part).  
See also supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text (reviewing the decision in Zadvydas). 
 158. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. at 576 (Breyer, J., dissenting in part) (citing id. at 540-43 
(Souter, J., dissenting in part)). 
 159. Id. at 577-79 (Breyer, J., dissenting in part).  Justice Breyer looked at the text of the 
statute and concluded that, because it states that the Attorney General shall “take into custody any 
alien . . . is deportable” it does not apply to “one who may, or may not, fall into that category.”  Id. 
at 578-79 (quoting in part 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2000)). 
 160. Id. (referring to the standards in 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b) (2000)). 
 161. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting in part). 
 162. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. at 577-78 (Breyer, J., dissenting in part). 
 163. See infra notes 174-184 and accompanying text (arguing that the Court merged equal 
protection and due process analysis). 
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criminal aliens.164  Further, this note will evaluate the interaction of this 
holding with post-September 11 attempts to increase our detention 
power over aliens such as the detentions conducted by the INS during 
the FBI investigation immediately after the September 11 terrorist 
attacks,165 the INS’ automatic stay rule,166 and the alien detention 
provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act.167 
A.  Due Process Analysis 
Although the Supreme Court did acknowledge and affirm that 
aliens are entitled to due process protections,168 its evasion of established 
due process standards and analysis169 weakens due process protections 
for aliens and may well serve as a foundation for a future erosion of 
protections for citizens.170  Not only did the Court confuse the suspect 
 
 164. See Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of 
Mandatory Predeportation Detention Provision of Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.A. § 
1226(c)) as Amended, 187 A.L.R. Fed. 325 (2003) (describing current case law regarding 
mandatory predeportation detention).  See also supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text 
(suggesting the impact of this decision). 
 165. See generally OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE SEPTEMBER 
11 DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN 
CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS 69-71 (2003) [hereinafter 
SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES] (describing the process by which aliens were detained immediately 
after the September 11 terrorist attacks and the failures associated with this process).  See also infra 
notes 227-240 and accompanying text (reviewing the post-September 11 responses that affected 
aliens). 
 166. Immigration Court Rules of Procedure, 8 CFR § 1003.19(i)(2) (2003) (staying the 
decision of an Immigration Judge to release an alien during the time that the INS seeks appeal of 
that decision).  See also infra notes 241-247 and accompanying text (discussing the automatic stay 
rule and its implementation). 
 167. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), 107 Pub. L. No. 56, 115 Stat. 272 
(2001) (8 U.S.C. § 1226a) [hereinafter USA PATRIOT Act].  See also infra notes 248-262 and 
accompanying text (reviewing the USA PATRIOT Act’s provisions affecting terrorist aliens). 
 168. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. at 523.  “It is well established that the Fifth Amendment 
entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.”  Id. (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 
U.S. 292 (1993)). 
 169. Id. at 528 (reasoning that “when the Government deals with deportable aliens, the Due 
Process Clause does not require it to employ the least burdensome means to accomplish its goal).  
See also supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text (discussing the Hyung Joon Kim holding).  
Typical due process jurisprudence requires any infringement on a fundamental right to be “narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”  Reno, 507 U.S. at 301-02. 
 170. David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 989 (2002). 
While security measures have often been initially targeted at immigrants, they have just 
as often laid the groundwork for future deprivations of citizens’ rights as well.  What we 
do to immigrants creates a precedent that then makes it more thinkable to do the same to 
citizens.  Thus, from the long view, all citizens have a stake in how we treat aliens in 
times of crisis.  Unfortunately, not many citizens take the long view. 
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classification analysis of equal protection with the fundamental interest 
analysis of substantive due process,171 but it also allowed the 
categorization of a group of people that would otherwise be entitled to 
individualized determinations of the necessity of their detention.172  
Furthermore, the Court’s modification of substantive due process 
analysis creates questions about what the standard is, and to whom this 
modification applies.173 
1.  Blurring Suspect Classification Analysis with Fundamental 
Interest Analysis 
In Zadvydas v. Davis, the Court decided that detention of aliens 
during immigration proceedings does implicate a protected liberty 
interest.174  Rather than addressing this question as such, the Court in 
Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim placed much of its emphasis on the ability 
of Congress to treat aliens differently than citizens.175  Precedent does 
support this assertion; however, this precedent has been in the context of 
equal protection analysis,176 Fourth Amendment protections to aliens 
 
Id. at 989. 
 171. See infra notes 174-184 and accompanying text (arguing that the Court blurred suspect 
class and fundamental interest analysis). 
 172. See infra notes 185-196 and accompanying text (arguing that the Court inappropriately 
evaded the narrowly tailored requirement).  David Cole argues that this lack of an individualized 
determination transforms the detention of aliens from a civil detention into punishment.  David 
Cole, In Aid of Removal: Due Process Limits on Immigration Detention, 51 EMORY L.J. 1003, 1011-
12 (2002).  Cole avoids the fundamental right analysis, relying instead on precedent such as 
Salerno.  Id. at 1020.  He does go on to suggest, however, that mandatory detention of criminal 
aliens fails rational basis review because “where an alien poses neither a danger nor a flight risk, his 
removal may be effectuated without detention, and detention therefore serves no legitimate 
government purpose.”  Id. at 1007, 1021, 1026. 
 173. See infra notes 193-194 and accompanying text (arguing that the Court’s decision creates 
more questions than it answers). 
 174. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696 (2001).  The Court responded to an argument that 
the aliens in Zadvydas had a diminished liberty interest because they had been ordered removed by 
noting that “an alien’s liberty interest is, at the least, strong enough to raise a serious question as to 
whether, irrespective of the procedures used, the Constitution permits detention that is indefinite and 
potentially permanent.”  Id. 
 175. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. at 521-22 (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 
(1976) for the proposition that Congress can make “rules that would be unacceptable if applied to 
citizens” when exercising its power over immigration). 
 176. E.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).  Aliens challenged the constitutionality of 
denial of Medicare Part B supplemental medical insurance for aliens who had not been admitted for 
permanent residence and resided in the United States for at least five years.  Id. at 70.  The emphasis 
in this case was one the question of whether Congress could treat aliens differently for the purpose 
of statutory benefits, which is an equal protection question.  Id. at 67, 69, 73.  Thus, the focus was 
on whether there was a rational basis for the distinction between aliens and citizens, and whether 
this distinction was invidious.  Id. at 73-74. 
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outside the country, and aliens detained at the borders, rather than 
substantive due process analysis.177 
Suspect classification analysis and fundamental right analysis are 
two distinct tests for two distinct protections.178  Rather than focusing on 
the characteristics of the right that is infringed to determine what 
standard of review should apply, equal protection focuses on the 
characteristics of the group that is discriminated against.179  That is, the 
Court will apply strict scrutiny to distinction based on suspect classes, 
intermediate scrutiny to distinctions based on quasi-suspect classes, and 
rational basis review to all other distinctions.180  However, equal 
 
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida tested the statute’s distinction 
according to the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and 
held that it was “invalid because it was not both rationally based and free from invidious 
discrimination.”  Id. at 73.  The Supreme Court reversed, in part because it held that the statute 
survived equal protection analysis because “[t]he fact that an Act of Congress treats aliens 
differently from citizens does not in itself imply that such disparate treatment is invidious.”  Id at 
80.  Although the Court reasoned that there should be a “narrow standard of review of decisions 
made by the Congress or the President in the area of immigration and naturalization” and noted that 
“in the exercise of its broad power over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes 
rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens,” this was in the context of a claim that denial 
of a statutory medical insurance program violated equal protection.  Matthews, 426 U.S. at 69-70, 
79-82.  For example, the Court concluded that “the fact that Congress has provided some welfare 
benefits for citizens does not require it to provide like benefits for [a]ll aliens” and reasoned that 
“[t]he decision to share that bounty [which ‘a conscientious sovereign makes available to its own 
citizens’] with our guests may take into account the nature of the relationship between the alien and 
this country.”  Id at 80. 
 177. See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993) (concentrating on the rights of juveniles 
rather than aliens and holding that, absent an available parent, close relative, or legal guardian, 
juveniles have no fundamental right to be released from government custody into the care of a 
private custodian); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 258 (1990) (holding that a search 
by Drug Enforcement Administration agents in a foreign country conducted to provide evidence in a 
trial regarding an alien who was apprehended in a foreign country and brought to the United States 
for trial does not violate either the Fourth Amendment or equal protection portion of the Fifth 
Amendment); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) (holding that Congress could give a preference for 
immigration decisions to the relationship between an illegitimate child and mother without giving it 
to the relationship between an illegitimate child and father). 
 178. See Cole, supra note 170, at 982 (noting that, while aliens may be treated differently than 
citizens when there is a rational basis, “distinctions between citizens and aliens do not generally 
justify differential application of First Amendment speech and association rights or Fifth 
Amendment due process protections”). 
 179. E.g., Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 82-84 (2000) (holding that 
discrimination based on ages does not affect a suspect class).  Factors that determine whether the 
class is suspect include whether the classification is “so seldom relevant to the achievement of any 
legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice 
and antipathy,” whether the class has “been subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment,” 
and whether the class is “a discrete and insular minority.”  Id. at 83 (quoting Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Ctr,, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) and Massachusetts Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 
313 (1976)). 
 180. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). 
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protection is just one path toward strict scrutiny.181  Fundamental interest 
analysis is another, but in this case, it was the path not taken.182  Even if 
 
In considering whether state legislation violates the Equal Protection Clause . . . we 
apply different levels of scrutiny to different types of classifications. At a minimum, a 
statutory classification must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.  
Classifications based on race or national origin and classifications affecting fundamental 
rights are given the most exacting scrutiny.  Between these extremes of rational basis 
review and strict scrutiny lies a level of intermediate scrutiny, which generally has been 
applied to discriminatory classifications based on sex or illegitimacy. 
Id. 
The Court applies rational basis review when the distinction is based on neither a suspect 
class nor quasi-suspect class.  E.g., Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 428 U.S. 62, 84 (2000) 
(explaining that, under rational basis review, the Court “will not overturn such [government action] 
unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any 
combination of legitimate purposes that [the Court] can only conclude that the [government’s] 
actions were irrational”) (alteration in original); Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 
458-59, 60 (1988) (holding that a state may allow local school boards to charge for bus service 
because the poor are not a suspect class, education is not a fundamental right, and therefore the state 
only needed a rational justification for this action); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 (1972) 
(holding a state may not place people in “different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated 
to the objective of that statute”). 
Intermediate scrutiny applies when the distinction is based on a quasi-suspect class such as 
classifications based on sex or illegitimacy.  Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988); Mississippi 
Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-24 (1982) (explaining that, when there is a 
classification based on gender, the state has a burden to show that the “classification serves 
important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially 
related to the achievement of those objectives”); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 101 (1982) 
(reasoning that discrimination based on illegitimacy “will survive equal protection scrutiny to the 
extent [it is] substantially related to a legitimate state interest”); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 
(1976) (stating “classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must 
be substantially related to achievement of those objectives”). 
 181. See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, (1997) (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 
(1996) for the proposition that “if a legislative classification or distinction neither burdens a 
fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, [it will be upheld] so long as it bears a rational relation 
to some legitimate end”); Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 457-58; Romer, 517 U.S. at 620, 631, 635 
(concluding that a state constitutional amendment that prohibited any state or local action designed 
to protect homosexual people served no legitimate government purpose).  “Unless a statute 
provokes strict judicial scrutiny because it interferes with a fundamental right or discriminates 
against a suspect class, it will ordinarily survive equal protection attack so long as the challenged 
classification is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.”  Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 
457-58. 
Under the due process guarantee, the Court often employs strict scrutiny (the compelling 
interest test) in reviewing legislation which limits fundamental constitutional rights. 
However the Court will also use this standard of review under the equal protection 
guarantee in two categories of civil liberties cases: first, when the governmental act 
classifies people in terms of their ability to exercise a fundamental right; second, when 
the governmental classification distinguishes between persons, in terms of any right, 
upon some “suspect” basis. 
RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 18.3 (6th ed. 
2000). 
 182. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. at 521, 527-28 (relying on Congress’ plenary power over 
29
Smith: Charles Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2005
SMITH.DOC 12/17/2004  12:13 PM 
236 AKRON LAW REVIEW [38:207 
Congress may treat aliens differently than citizens based on their lack of 
citizenship for purposes such as statutory benefits, once the Court 
determines that Congress has infringed on their fundamental interests, it 
should apply strict scrutiny.183  Here, however, the Court determined that 
even though a fundamental interest was implicated, strict scrutiny was 
not the appropriate standard of review.184 
2.  Eliminating Hearings and Modifying Due Process 
The Court in Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim accepted statistical 
studies to justify a blanket rule of detention rather than requiring 
individualized determinations of risk of flight and dangerousness.185  
The Court reasoned that these studies were sufficient to support this 
approach even though other studies suggested another course of 
action.186  It pointed to Los Angeles v. Alameda to support its reliance on 
 
immigration to justify departing from the strict scrutiny test, such that Congress need not use the 
least burdensome means). 
 183. See Richard A. Brisbin, Jr. & Edward V. Heck, The Battle Over Strict Scrutiny: 
Coalitional Conflict in the Rehnquist Court, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1049 (1992) (tracing the 
Rehnquist Court’s use of heightened scrutiny in cases involving freedom of expression, freedom of 
association, free exercise of religion, establishment of religion, equal protection, and substantive 
due process).  Brisbin and Heck argue that “the trend during the Rehnquist Court has been toward 
the use of divergent standards of review in different settings.”  Id. at 1050.  With respect to 
substantive due process cases, they conclude that the Court has struggled internally with defining 
what are substantive rights more than what level of scrutiny applies when substantive due process 
rights are implicated.  Id. at 1097.  They also predicted that Justice Brennan’s replacement by 
Justice Souter could lead to “increased resort to deferential standards” in areas other than racial 
equal protection and political speech where heightened scrutiny had been previously been applied.  
Id. at 1105. 
 184. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. at 527-28 (avoiding the narrowly tailored requirement of strict 
scrutiny and instead stating that Congress need not use the least burdensome means). 
 185. Id. at 523, n.6, 527-28.  The Court found support in S. REP. 104-48, p. 2 (1995) for the 
contention that twenty percent of released deportable criminal aliens did not appear for their 
removal hearings.  Id. at 518.  The Court also pointed to a 1986 study that that showed that after 
criminal aliens were identified as deportable, seventy-seven percent were arrested again before their 
deportation proceedings began.  Id. (citing Hearing on H.R. 3333 Before the Subcommittee on 
Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 101st 
Cong. 54, 52 (1989)).  But see Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. at 562-68 (Souter, J., dissenting in part) 
(disputing the relevance of the studies and the majority’s reliance on them). 
 186. Id. at 527-28.  See also OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
INSPECTION REPORT: IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE DEPORTATION OF ALIENS 
AFTER FINAL ORDERS HAVE BEEN ISSUED, 15 (Mar. 1996) [hereinafter DEPORTATION OF ALIENS], 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/inspection/INS/9603/index.htm. 
Limits imposed by personnel, funding, detention space, and related resources affected 
how soon, and how many, aliens were removed. District managers and [Detention and 
Deportation] officers in several locations expressed frustration over their inability to 
remove aliens with final orders. They attributed this inability in part to the workload and 
the resources for handling it and to humanitarian and political conditions and pressures 
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these studies.187  Although Alameda allowed the use of studies to support 
the government’s contention that its end was substantial, it did not 
suggest that the Court should use studies to satisfy the means of strict 
scrutiny such that the government could group people to deny them 
individualized process.188 
Determining whether the government has a compelling interest is a 
step of strict scrutiny that evaluates the ends of the government, and it is 
for this step that Alameda allowed the use of statistics.189  The Court in 
Hyung Joon Kim evaded the next step, which requires it to determine 
whether the infringement on a fundamental interest is narrowly tailored 
and thus evaluate the means chosen to reach the end, and instead used 
the statistics to conclude that the means were appropriate.190  It 
explained that the statistics suggested that the INS was failing to remove 
sufficient aliens when there had been discretionary release.191  When 
Kim raised the argument that Congress should have instead addressed 
the lack of funding and detention space, the real problem behind the 
INS’ failure,  the Court departed from strict scrutiny by answering that 
Congress was not required “to employ the least burdensome means to 
accomplish its goal” when it “deals with deportable aliens.”192 
 
interfering with carrying out immigration laws. District officials noted that in making 
choices about whom to detain, they tended to detain the aliens who can be removed most 
easily. 
Id. 
 187. Id. (citing Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 436-37 (2002)). 
 188. Alameda, 535 U.S. at 434-36 (permitting the use of a study to support a substantial 
interest in the context of regulating secondary effects of protected speech).  The Court did not 
address the validity of the judgment because the case had come to the Court on summary judgment.  
Id. at 439.  However, the Court did reason that shoddy data or reasoning would not be sufficient and 
one may shift the burden back to the government by showing that study does not support the 
government’s interest or bringing evidence that disputes the government’s findings.  Id. at 438-39. 
 189. Id. at 434-36 (addressing the argument over whether there was a substantial interest (end), 
not whether the means were appropriate). 
 190. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. at 528 (observing that “[t] he evidence Congress had before it 
certainly supports the approach it selected even if other, hypothetical studies might have suggested 
different courses of action”).  See supra note 21 and accompanying text (noting that any 
infringement on a fundamental interest must be narrowly tailored). 
 191. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. at 528.  The majority argued that the statistics suggested “that 
permitting discretionary release of aliens pending their removal hearings would lead to large 
numbers of deportable criminal aliens skipping their hearings and remaining at large in the United 
States unlawfully.”  Id.  However, the majority itself earlier pointed out that when there was 
discretionary release, the failure was in large part due to “severe limitations on funding and 
detention space, which considerations affected its release determinations.”  Id. at 519.  The Court 
essentially concluded that when Congress found that it is not detaining enough individuals due to a 
lack of funding and detention space, Congress could remedy this problem by requiring mandatory 
detention, without necessarily remedying the lack of funding or detention space.  Id. 
 192. Id. at 528.  See also Tineo v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 382, 399 n.12 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing 
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Although the Court departed from the narrowly tailored 
requirement of strict scrutiny, it failed to provide an explanation of why 
it made this departure or what standard of review it was applying, and 
instead dropped it into the opinion as if it were an inevitable conclusion 
from established law.193  The Court might have explained its departure 
by explaining that Congress’ plenary power over substantive 
immigration decisions should also allow Congress greater deference 
regarding decisions about how to implement these substantive 
decisions.194  It might also have drawn an analogy to its prison cases, 
another area where it has created an exception.195  Failing to explain 
what standard of review it applied, the Court left it to lower courts to 
struggle with Hyung Joon Kim to determine when and how to apply this 
exception.196 
 
Hyung Joon Kim for the proposition that Congress need not use the least burdensome means when 
dealing with deportable aliens); DEPORTATION OF ALIENS, supra note 186. 
 193. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. at 528 (explaining that the least burdensome means need not 
be used, but providing neither a citation nor an explanation of this conclusion). 
 194. See generally Natsu Taylor Saito, Enduring Effect of the Chinese Exclusion Cases: The 
“Plenary Power” Justification for On-going Abuses of Human Rights, 10 ASIAN L.J. 13 (2003) 
(tracing the development of the plenary power, arguing that it has allowed for abuse of disfavored 
groups, and suggesting constitutional and legislative remedies to this problem). 
 195. E.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224, 227 (1990) (holding that a prison inmate 
with a serious mental illness may be forced to take psychiatric medications when the inmate is 
dangerous and the treatment is in the inmate’s medical interest because a state’s interests in safety 
and security are of such importance that any infringements on constitutional rights need only be 
“reasonably related to legitimate penological interests”); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 99-100 
(1987) (upholding restrictions on prisoners’ correspondence with prisoners at other different 
institutions but rejecting a prohibition on allowing a prisoner to marry without the prison 
superintendent’s permission because this marriage restriction was “not reasonably related to 
legitimate penological objectives”); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545-46, 554 (1979) (noting that, 
while prisoners due retain constitutional protections during confinement, these protections are 
limited such that “they are subject to reasonable limitation or retraction in light of the legitimate 
security concerns of the institution”). 
 196. E.g., Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d 263, 268-70 (6th Cir. 2003) (struggling with whether to 
apply strict scrutiny, rational basis, an extensive to its purpose test that balances several factors, or a 
strong special justification test); Zavala v. Ridge, 310 F.Supp.2d 1071 (N.D. Cal. 2004) 1076-1078 
(applying strict scrutiny to review whether an automatic stay of an Immigration Judge’s decision to 
release an alien on bond).  In addition to reviewing strict scrutiny and rational basis review, the 
court in Ly suggested that another test for non-punitive regulatory legislation asks whether the 
detention is “excessive to its purpose.” Ly, 351 F.3d at 268. The court actually avoided these tests 
and instead asked whether there is a “strong special justification” for the detention, whether the 
detention has a “reasonable relation” to the reason for the detention, and requiring for indefinite 
civil detention something more than dangerousness alone or a “general goal of preventing danger to 
the community.”  Id. (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690-91 (2001)). 
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B.  Implications for Aliens 
1.  Deportable Aliens 
Although Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim will serve as precedent for 
the proposition that Congress must be extremely clear to habeas corpus 
jurisdiction,197 the Court’s view of the liberty rights of aliens is less than 
clear.198  The Court limited its declaration that Congress need not 
“employ the least burdensome means to accomplish its goal” to 
deportable aliens.199  Its failure to describe what it meant by 
“deportable” is troubling because, at the time of Kim’s habeas corpus 
petition, Kim had not yet had his removal hearing to determine whether 
he would in fact be deported.200  Because the INS had not yet made a 
final determination of Kim’s deportability, the only thing that 
distinguished him from other aliens was the INS’ allegation he was 
subject to mandatory deportation.201  This leaves open the question 
whether the Court really means all aliens when it proclaims that 
Congress need not use least burdensome means.202  The Court’s 
emphasis on Kim’s concession that he was deportable may have been an 
 
 197. E.g., Ali v. INS, 346 F.3d 873, 878-80 (9th Cir. 2003) (using Hyung Joon Kim for support 
that a clear statement is needed to repeal habeas jurisdiction and finding that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), 
which states that “no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any 
alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, 
adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien” does not contain a sufficiently clear 
statement); Ogbudimkpa v. Ashcroft, 342 F.3d 207, 216 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Hyung Joon Kim for 
the proposition that the statutes must “state explicitly that a district court may not exercise 
jurisdiction over habeas corpus claims”). 
 198. See, e.g., Joshua W. Gardner, Note, Halfway There: Zadvydas v. Davis Reins in Indefinite 
Detentions, But leaves Much Unanswered, 36 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 177, 196, 206 (2002) (noting that 
the Court may have lessened the plenary deference accorded in immigration matters but arguing that 
the lower courts may have difficulty with the Zadvydas opinion). 
 199. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. at 527-28.  The Court found Kim’s concession to be important 
because the Court believed that it was because of the concession that Kim did not take advantage of 
a procedural protection and the Court did not need to reach a conclusion on the merits of his case.  
Id. at 523 n.6.  It made a distinction between one conceding that he is deportable and conceding that 
he will ultimately be deported, but did not explain this distinction.  Id.  The Court explained that 
they believed Kim’s concession was not the “real issue in this case.”  Id.  However, the Court did 
limit its holding to those who concede the deportability.  Id. at 532. 
 200. Id. at 542 (Souter, J., dissenting in part) (noting that “the District Court would probably 
have dismissed [Kim’s] claim as unexhausted” if Kim had included in it a challenge to removal 
because there had not yet been a hearing on the issue of removability).  Id. 
 201. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. at 513. 
 202. Id. at 523 n.6, 529-30.  “Lest there be any confusion, we emphasize that by conceding he 
is ‘deportable’ and, hence, subject to mandatory detention under § 1226(c), respondent did not 
concede that he will ultimately be deported.”  Id. at 523 n.6. 
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attempt to avoid this implication.203 
Although Kim did not dispute that he was convicted of the crimes 
that led to the allegation that he was deportable,204 there has been much 
litigation regarding which crimes suffice for § 1226.205  In addition, even 
though the Court noted that Kim did not take advantage of a Joseph 
hearing206 in which he could have challenged the INS’ allegations,207 this 
does not lead to the conclusion that he was deportable.208  This hearing 
requires an alien to prove that it is substantially unlikely that the 
government will prevail during the removal proceeding.209  Kim may 
have decided that he would not prevail at this hearing, but still hoped 
that he would prevail in the actual removal proceeding.210  The Court’s 
 
 203. Id.  at 532.  “The INS detention of respondent, a criminal alien who has conceded that he 
is deportable, for the limited period of his removal proceedings, is governed by these cases.”  Id.  
The Seventh Circuit subsequently concluded that an alien’s good-faith challenge to his deportability 
will get him beyond the Hyung Joon Kim holding, such that he may be entitled to an individualized 
determination of whether detention is appropriate.  Gonzalez v. O’Connell, 355 F.3d 1010, 1020-21 
(7th Cir. 2004) (citing Hyung Joon Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1722, 1738).  In this case, Carlos Gonzalez 
claimed that he had raised a good-faith claim as to his deportability because he had been sentenced 
to only probation and the state law provided that “probationary dispositions . . . are not 
convictions.”  Id. at 1013.  The court reasoned that Gonzalez had not raised a claim sufficient for 
their good-faith exception to Hyung Joon Kim because the court had previously determined that “a 
probationary disposition [under this state’s law] following a plea of guilty qualifies as a conviction” 
for the purpose of § 1101(a)(48)(A).  Id. at 1020.  It was concerned that if “any claim, no matter 
how ridiculous” would be sufficient to get beyond mandatory detention, the holding in Hyung Joon 
Kim and Congress’ intent behind § 1226(c) would become “practically void.” Id. 
 204. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. at 513. 
 205. See, e.g., Christina LaBrie, Lack of Uniformity in the Deportation of Criminal Aliens, 25 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 357 (1999) (discussing the difficulties of applying the aggravated 
felony and crimes of moral turpitude standards to states that have various definitions and 
punishments for crimes). 
 206. In re Joseph, 221 I. & N. Dec. 799 (BIA 1999) (interpreting 8 CFR § 1003.19 (2003) to 
require a preliminary hearing in which an alien must convince the immigration judge that the 
government will be substantially unlikely to prevail).  See also 8 CFR § 1003.19(h)(2)(ii) (2003) 
(stating “nothing in this paragraph shall be construed as prohibiting an alien from seeking a 
determination by an immigration judge that the alien is not properly included within any of those 
paragraphs”).  A lawful permanent resident may challenge his mandatory detention only by 
claiming that he is not properly included in the mandatory detention category.  HELEN A. SKLAR ET 
AL., THE IMMIGRATION ACT OF 1990 TODAY § 12:25 (2003).  The alien must prove that “it is 
substantially unlikely that the INS will prevail on the charge of removability” to obtain relief from 
detention.  Id. 
 207. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. at 513, 514 n.3. 
 208. See id. at 578 (Breyer, J., dissenting in part) (explaining that § 1226(c) “tells the Attorney 
General to take into custody any alien who . . . is deportable, not one who may, or may not, fall into 
that category”). 
 209. See supra note 206 (describing the source of the Joseph hearing). 
 210. See Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. at 542 n.3 (Souter, J., dissenting in part) (comparing a 
finding that an alien concedes that he is removable when he does not take advantage of his Joseph 
hearing is analogous to finding “that a civil defendant has conceded liability by failing to move to 
dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or that a criminal defendant 
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decision will increase the administrative burden on the INS because 
aliens will now take advantage of this hearing, even if they do not think 
they will prevail, simply so they may reserve the right to challenge their 
detentions.211  Further, this hearing would have addressed the merits of 
the deportation, not Kim’s real contention, which was the necessity of 
his detention.212 
2.  During Removal Detentions 
The following rules may summarize the Court’s current position 
with regard to due process protections for aliens detained during 
immigration proceedings.  Aliens who have entered the United States 
have more protections than those detained at the border213 or people not 
within the United States.214  Aliens are entitled to due process 
protections during deportation proceedings;215 however, Congress need 
not use the “least burdensome means to accomplish its goal” when 
dealing with deportable aliens.216  Detention of aliens or citizens must 
not extend beyond the point when the goal of the detention “is no longer 
practically attainable” or “no longer bears a reasonable relation to the 
purpose for which the individual was committed.”217  The INS may 
 
has conceded guilt by failing to dispute the validity of the indictment”). 
 211. E.g., Gonzalez v. O’Connell, 355 F.3d 1010, 1019-20 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that Hyung 
Joon Kim “left open the question of whether mandatory detention under § 1226(c) is consistent with 
due process when a detainee makes a colorable claim that he is not in fact deportable” but 
concluding that a good faith challenge would be sufficient to raise a due process challenge to 
detention). 
 212. SKLAR, supra note 208, at § 12:25 (noting that the purpose of the hearing is to review 
whether the alien is properly included in the mandatory detention category). 
 213. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (citing Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 
185 (1958) and Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228 (1925)). 
 214. Id. (citing United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269 (1990) and Johnson v. 
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 784 (1950) for support). 
 215. See, e.g., Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. at 522; Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690; Reno v. Flores, 
507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993). 
 216. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. at 527-28.  See also Pequeno-Martinez v. Trominski, 281 
F.Supp.2d 902, 922 (S.D. Texas 2003) (relying on Hyung Joon Kim for the proposition that 
Congress’ plenary power over immigration decisions does limit review of substantive immigration 
decisions such that substantive due process rights of aliens “are subject to limitations and conditions 
that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens,” but reasoning that the procedures Congress uses 
to implement its policy are still “subject to more exacting judicial review.”) 
 217. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (citing Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972)).  But see 
Agyeman v. Coachman, 74 Fed. Appx. 691, 692-94 (9th Cir. 2003) (unpublished memorandum 
decision) (citing Hyung Joon Kim for support to find that the INS’ six-year detention of Emmanuel 
Senyo Agyeman was constitutional because, in addition to the fact that he had an individualized 
bond determination, the length of detention was attributable to continuances to allow time for 
Agyeman to hire a lawyer, continuances to allow Agyeman to present certain evidence, time for an 
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detain criminal aliens for the brief period necessary218 for their removal 
proceedings without an individualized determination of their risk of 
flight or dangerousness if they concede that they are deportable.219  
However, some individualized procedures may be required to ensure 
some merit to the charge and there may need to be an individualized 
determination of risk of flight and dangerousness “if the continued 
detention [becomes] unreasonable or unjustified.”220 
 
appeal of the IJ’s decision, time for an appeal of a final removal order, and time for reversal and 
remand). 
 218. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. at 513 (indicating that the detention may be “for the brief 
period necessary for [the alien’s] removal proceedings”).  See Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d 263, 271 (6th 
Cir. 2003) (holding that the limitation for pre-removal detention must be reasonable, as determined 
by the facts of each case); Ashley v. Ridge, 288 F.Supp.2d 662, 673 (D. N.J. 2003) (rejecting 
automatic stays of Immigration Judges’ decisions to release on bond because this procedure would 
not ensure that the detentions would be limited to the month and a half to five months that the Court 
seemed to find acceptable in Hyung Joon Kim). 
 219. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. at 532.  See, e.g., Gonzalez v. O’Connell, 355 F.3d 1010, 1919 
(7th Cir. 2004) (noting that Hyung Joon Kim “was expressly premised” on the fact that Kim had 
conceded that he was deportable); Likens v. Reno, 330 F.3d 547 (2d Cir. 2003) (ruling that, even 
though Maurice Truman Aikens was challenging the validity of his removal order and the court 
could not review these challenges because they had not been administratively exhausted, Aikens 
had conceded that he was deportable, and thus Hyung Joon Kim permitted his detention during the 
removal proceedings); Ashley v. Ridge, 288 F.Supp.2d 662, 672 (D. N.J. 2003) (noting that Hyung 
Joon Kim was distinguishable because the alien in Ashley had “demanded the hearing to which he 
was entitled”).  Contra Fraser v. Ashcroft, No. 02CV4417SJ, 2003 WL 21143031, *1-4 (E.D. N.Y. 
2003) (concluding that Hyung Joon Kim stands simply for the proposition that detention during 
removal proceedings is constitutional and allowing the detention of John Fraser, an alien who was 
actively challenging his deportability). 
 220. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. at 538 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  E.g., Zgombic v. 
Farquilarson, 69 Fed.Appx. 2 (2d Cir. 2003) (unpublished summary order) (remanding the case 
because the district court had the “occasion to consider whether the facts of this case fall into the 
potential exceptions noted in” Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Hyung Joon Kim); Uritsky 
v. Ridge, 286 F.Supp.2d 842 (E.D. Mich. 2003).  See also supra notes 143-146 and accompanying 
text (reviewing Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion).  Alexander Grigorievich Uritski is a citizen 
of Israel who entered the United States in 1996, became a lawful permanent resident in 2002, and 
pled guilty to Third Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct on September 24, 2002 at the age of 17.  Id. at 
843 (citing Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 762.11-762.15).  After the INS detained Uritski in October 
2002 pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226, Uritski challenged his removability because the state court had 
assigned him to probation instead of entering a judgment of conviction.  Id. (claiming that this did 
not serve as an aggravated felony for the purpose of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(A) & 
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)).  Although the Immigration Court agreed with Uritski and granted him bond, the 
government immediately appealed, which automatically stayed the bond determination.  Id. (citing 
the automatic stay provision of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(i)(2)).  Distinguishing Hyung Joon Kim, the 
court observed that Uritski’s eleven-month detention was longer the average of four months which 
the Hyung Joon Kim Court used to determine that detention is permissible “for the brief period 
necessary for . . . removal proceedings.”  Id. at 843, 846 (quoting Hyung Joon Kim, 123 S. Ct. 1708, 
1712).  Relying in part on Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Hyung Joon Kim, the court held 
that Uritski was “entitled to an individualized determination that his detention is necessary to further 
a sufficiently compelling governmental need.”  Id. at 846 (citing Hyung Joon Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 
1722 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
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Taken together, Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim and Zadvydas v. Davis 
may ironically provide that criminal aliens must be removed from homes 
and detained while they wait for their removal hearing, but they must be 
released back to their homes after they are ordered removed if removal 
cannot be effectuated.221  Criminal aliens might even receive less 
protection than terrorist aliens.222  Although the Court explained the 
distinction between Zadvydas and Hyung Joon Kim was that Zadvydas 
involved potentially indefinite detention while Hyung Joon Kim 
involved detentions with an end point, perhaps the real distinction was 
that Zadvydas was decided before the September 11 terrorist attacks 
while Hyung Joon Kim was decided after.223  Although the Court did not 
recognize the “white elephant” in the room, probably because the cases 
involved criminal rather than terrorist aliens, it might have recognized 
that the attacks may have increased the level of the government’s 
compelling interest in detaining aliens.224  However, modification of due 
process analysis and disparate treatment of aliens during a time of 
perceived need for increased security may not only have a lasting impact 
on aliens, but may also serve as a stepping stone toward decreased 
protections of citizens.225  In any event, it is unlikely that the Court had 
 
 221. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. at 532 (allowing detention while a removal hearing is 
pending); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701-02 (2001) (establishing time limits for detention 
after the INS orders removal). 
 222. See infra notes 248-255 and accompanying text (reviewing the USA PATRIOT Act 
provisions for terrorist aliens). 
 223. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (decided on April 29, 2003); Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678 
(decided on June 28, 2001). 
 224. Cole, supra note 170, at 955 (noting that “[i]n the wake of September 11, we plainly need 
to rethink the balance between liberty and security”).  Cole observes that, in times of crisis, the need 
for security will be weighted too heavily over the value of liberty because “[l]iberty is almost by 
definition abstract” while “[f]ear . . . is immediate and palpable.”  Id. at 955-56. 
 225. See Cole, supra note 170, at 957, 959, 989-1003 (arguing that the Enemy Alien Act 
served as a foundation for the detention of Japanese ancestry during World War II and that the 
Palmer Raids of 1919-1920, which targeted “alien radicals” in response to bombs that were 
exploded in eight cities and led to the arrest of 4,000 to 10,000 individuals, served as a foundation 
for the McCarthy red scare); David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on 
Terrorism, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2003) (analogizing questionable responses to 
emergencies in the past to current responses during the war on terrorism such that “[t]oday’s war on 
terrorism has already demonstrated our government’s remarkable ability to evolve its tactics in ways 
that allow it simultaneously to repeat history and to insist that it is not repeating history”).  Cole 
noted that “what we do to aliens today may well pave the way for what will be done to citizens 
tomorrow.”  Cole, supra note 170, at 989. 
[W]hen one looks not at the quantity but at the quality of our response, it is clear that we 
have resurrected the very techniques that got us into trouble in the past—namely, 
expanding the substantive definitions of wrongdoing to encompass otherwise innocent 
political activity, relying on group identity rather than individual conduct for suspicion, 
and adopting administrative measures to avoid the safeguards associated with the 
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forgotten about the attacks and subsequent detentions during their 
deliberations.226 
C.  Post September 11 World 
Responding to the perceived need for increased security measures 
after the September 11 terrorist attacks, the United States undertook a 
variety of measures227 to increase its detention powers,228 especially with 
 
criminal process. 
Cole, The New McCarthyism supra at 29. 
 226. See infra notes 227-262 and accompanying text (discussing actions taken to increase 
detention power over aliens subsequent to the September 11 attacks). 
 227. E.g., Memorandum from Michael J. Creppy, Chief Immigration Judge, to All Immigration 
Judges and Court Administrators 1 (Sep. 21, 2001) (setting forth secrecy requirements during 
immigration proceedings), available at http://archive.aclu.org/court/creppy_memo.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 27, 2004). 
As some of you already know, the Attorney General has implemented additional security 
procedures for certain cases in the Immigration Court.  Those procedures require us to 
hold the hearings individually, to close the hearing to the public, and to avoid discussing 
the case or otherwise disclosing any information about the case to anyone outside the 
Immigration Court. 
Id.  See Natsu Taylor Saito, Will Force Trump Legality After September 11?  American 
Jurisprudence Confronts the Rule of Law, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 8 (2002) (pointing out that a 
result of this policy is that “[w]e do not know who . . . is being held, where they are, . . . how they 
are being treated . . . who has been charged, or what violations of law, if any, are being alleged”). 
 228. See, e.g., Al-Marri v. Rumsfeld, No. 03-3674, 2004 WL 415279 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(affirming a dismissal of a habeas petition by an alien who was detained in the United States as a 
material witness because the petition was filed in Illinois, where he had been detained, instead of 
South Carolina, where he was transferred after being declared an enemy combatant); Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that a declaration that describes the circumstances 
under which Hamdi was captured “in a zone of active combat in a foreign theater of conflict” is 
sufficient to conclude that the President “had constitutionally detained Hamdi pursuant to the war 
powers entrusted to him by the . . . Constitution”), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 981 (2003); Padilla v. 
Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 698 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that “the President does not have the power 
under Article II of the Constitution to detain as an enemy combatant an American citizen seized on 
American soil outside a zone of combat” unless Congress authorizes such detentions), cert. granted, 
124 S. Ct. 1353 (2003); Gherebi v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1278 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the court had 
jurisdiction over Guantanamo because, rather than requiring sovereignty for jurisdiction, the court 
reasoned that territorial jurisdiction was sufficient); Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1140-
41 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (reasoning that “aliens outside the sovereign territory of the United States, 
regardless of whether they are enemy aliens,” are not entitled to constitutional protections so the 
court did not have jurisdiction to grant habeas relief to detainees being held by the United States at 
its Camp X-Ray base in Guantanamo Bay), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 534 (2003).  Because these 
detentions, which involve aliens and citizens, involve legal questions regarding the “enemy 
combatant” designation, the scope of the President’s war powers, Congress’ war powers, standing, 
and the jurisdictional reach of the Constitution, this note will not address these cases.  See Chris K. 
Iijima, Shooting Justice Jackson’s “Loaded Weapon” at Ysar Hamdi: Judicial Abdication at the 
Convergence of Korematsu and McCarthy, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 109, 113 (2004) (suggesting that 
post-September 11 detentions involve a “‘hidden’ racial message of anti-Muslim sentiment”); 
Daniel Kanstroom, Unlawful Combatants in the United States, 30-WTR HUM. RTS. 18 (2003) 
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regard to aliens.229  Immediately after the attacks, the INS, in 
cooperation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), detained 
more than one thousand aliens during its investigation into the attacks.230  
As part of this process, the Department of Justice developed a hold-until-
cleared policy, which instructed the INS to detain aliens until the FBI 
gave clearance for release, even after their removal was possible.231  The 
Attorney General also gave permission to INS District Directors to file 
appeals after immigration judges order the release of aliens, thereby 
automatically staying the release orders.232  Finally, Congress passed the 
USA PATRIOT Act, which expanded the power to detain terrorist 
aliens.233  Each step toward expansion of the detention power raises 
questions about how much protection the Due Process Clause has left to 
give. 
1.  Hold-Until-Cleared Policy 
Pursuant to the hold-until-cleared policy, the INS must detain aliens 
until the FBI has cleared them, even after a final order of removal or a 
voluntary decision by the alien to depart.234  The Department of Justice 
 
(reviewing the cases of Padilla and Hamdi and suggesting that the Judiciary should not decline 
habeas cases brought by enemy combatants); Stephen I. Vladeck, Note, The Detention Power, 22 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 153 (2004) (arguing that, although the Constitution allows for a detention 
power, it belongs to Congress rather than the President so the detentions of Hamdi and Padilla are 
susceptible to attack); This American Life: Secret Government (WBEZ Chicago radio broadcast, 
Jan. 10, 2003) (reviewing the facts and process of Padilla’s case, including interviews with his 
attorney Donna R. Newman), available at http://www.thislife.org/. 
 229. See infra notes 230-33 and accompanying text (reviewing briefly actions taken after 
September 11). 
 230. SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES, supra note 165, at 1.  After the number of detainees reached 
1,200, the Department of Justice stopped keeping count “because the statistics became confusing.”  
Id. at 1 n.1. 
 231. Id. at 37.  “This hold until cleared policy was not memorialized in writing, and our review 
could not determine the exact origins of the policy.  However, this policy was clearly communicated 
to INS and FBI officials in the field, who understood and applied the policy.”  Id. 
 232. Immigration Court Rules of Procedure, 8 CFR § 1003.19(i)(2) (2003).  The change made 
by the Attorney General increased the scope of the automatic stay provision beyond only aliens 
subject to mandatory detention.  Review of Custody Determinations, 66 Fed. Reg. 54909 (Oct. 31, 
2001) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(i)(2)). 
 233. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 412, 115, Stat. 272, 
350-52 (amending the Immigration and Nationality Act (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et 
seq. (2000)), by inserting § 236A, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1226a (West Supp. 2002)). 
 234. See Cole, supra note 172, at 1029.  Cole argues that these detentions violate due process 
because investigative detentions are unconstitutional for either the INS or FBI.  Id. at 1011-12.  He 
explains that these detentions serve no legitimate government interest because the INS may detain 
only for the purpose of effectuating removal.  Id. 
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conducted this policy in a haphazard manner, which led to extended 
detentions in harsh conditions.235  For example, although the INS and 
FBI were to apply this policy only to aliens “of interest,” this limitation 
had nothing to do with any evidence of a connection to terrorism or the 
September 11 attacks.236  The INS took a variety of measures to maintain 
detention of these aliens to comply with this policy.237  The INS made an 
automatic no-bond determination for all detainees, prohibited release of 
detainees without written permission from the INS Executive Associate 
Commissioner for Field Operations Michael Pearson, and established a 
Bond Unit to obtain evidence for bond hearings before the immigration 
judges.238  When the FBI failed to provide evidence to support a no-bond 
determination, the FBI provided INS counsel with boilerplate documents 
describing the FBI’s September 11 investigation in general.239  The INS 
also developed a method of automatically requesting continuances to 
 
 235. SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES, supra note 165, at 69-71.  The classification of aliens as “of 
interest” as well as the lack of resources and priority given to the clearance process led to substantial 
delays in release of the detainees.  Id. 
The FBI cleared less than 3 percent of the 762 September 11 detainees within three 
weeks of their arrest.  The average length of time from arrest of a September 11 detainee 
to clearance by FBI Headquarters was 80 days, and the median was 69 days. Further, we 
found that more than a quarter of the 762 detainees’ clearance investigations took longer 
than 3 months. 
Id. at 51.  There is evidence that the detainees were physically and verbally abused during their 
detention.  OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT 
ON SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES’ ALLEGATIONS OF ABUSE AT THE METROPOLITAN DETENTION 
CENTER IN BROOKLYN, NEW YORK 47 (2003). 
[S]ome [Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC)] staff members slammed and bounced 
detainees into the walls at the MDC and inappropriately pressed detainees’ heads against 
walls. We also found that some officers inappropriately twisted and bent detainees’ 
arms, hands, wrists, and fingers, and caused them unnecessary physical pain; 
inappropriately carried or lifted detainees; and raised or pulled detainees’ arms in painful 
ways. In addition, we believe some officers improperly used handcuffs, occasionally 
stepped on compliant detainees’ leg restraint chains, and were needlessly forceful and 
rough with the detainees – all conduct that violates [Federal Bureau of Prisons’] policy. 
Id. at 28. 
 236. SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES, supra note 165, at 41.  “Some appear to have been arrested 
more by virtue of chance encounters or tenuous connections to a[n FBI September 11 investigative] 
lead rather than by any genuine indications of a possible connection with or possession of 
information about terrorist activity.”  Id. at 41-42. 
 237. Id. at 76. 
 238. Id. at 76-77 (explaining that the requirement for written permission from Pearson (Pearson 
Letter) was issued as an order at INS Commissioner James Ziglar’s request).  The INS General 
Counsel opposed the Pearson Letter because he was concerned that “refusal to accept bond on an 
unappealed bond order, based solely on the need for a Pearson letter, was not legally defensible. . . .  
As a result, INS employees routinely faced the dilemma of choosing between following Pearson’s 
directive or the INS General Counsel’s advice.”  Id. at 86. 
 239. Id. at 78-79 (noting that the INS used these affidavits for at least two months). 
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maintain detention when it lacked adequate information from the FBI to 
support a no-bond determination.240 
2.  Automatic Stays of Release Determinations 
When the INS pursues an appeal of an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) 
decision to release an alien on bond, the appeal automatically stays the 
IJ’s decision.241  There is no language in the automatic stay regulation 
that requires the INS to make any showing that the stay is warranted.242  
As a result, the INS continues to detain aliens whom the IJ determined 
are not a risk of flight or a danger.243 
Although Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim dispensed with any 
requirement for an individualized determination of risk of flight or 
danger, the Court relied on Kim’s decision not to take advantage of a 
Joseph hearing244 and Justice Kennedy’s opinion explicitly stated that 
there should be some determination on the merits.245  This automatic 
 
 240. SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES, supra note 165, at 78, 81-84 (noting that the formalized 
version of this policy allowed the INS to stop seeking continuances when the FBI affirmatively 
notified the INS that they had no interest in the detainee, but confusion continued and “no interest” 
notifications were not timely). 
 241. Immigration Court Rules of Procedure, 8 CFR § 1003.19(i)(2) (2003).  A release is stayed 
“no matter how frivolous the appeal by the Government.”  Ashley v. Ridge, 288 F.Supp.2d 662, 
670-71 (D. N.J. 2003). 
 242. Ashley, 288 F.Supp.2d at 670-71. 
Automatic stay in certain cases. In any case in which the district director has determined 
that an alien should not be released or has set a bond of $10,000 or more, any order of 
the immigration judge authorizing release (on bond or otherwise) shall be stayed upon 
the Service’s filing of a Notice of Service Intent to Appeal Custody Redetermination . . . 
with the immigration court within one business day of the issuance of the order, and 
shall remain in abeyance pending decision of the appeal by the Board of Immigration 
Appeals. . . . 
Id. at 665. 
 243. Cole, supra note 172, at 1030-31.  Cole argues that a stay would be permissible when the 
INS does make a showing that it is warranted, but becomes “clearly excessive in relation to the 
government’s legitimate purposes, and therefore violated due process” without the showing.  Id. at 
1031.  He notes that this regulation takes the decision to detain away from the judge and places it 
with “the prosecutor who has by definition failed to persuade a judge in an adversary hearing that 
detention is justified.”  Id. 
 244. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. at 532.  See also supra note 206 (describing the Joseph 
hearing).  “In conceding that he was deportable, respondent forwent a hearing at which he would 
have been entitled to raise any nonfrivolous argument available to demonstrate that he was not 
properly included in a mandatory detention category.” Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. at 514.  The 
Court also explicitly limited holding to the fact he “conceded that he is deportable.”  Id. at 532. 
 245. Id. at 532 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  “[D]ue process requires individualized procedures to 
ensure there is at least some merit to the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s (INS) charge 
and, therefore, sufficient justification to detain a lawful permanent resident alien pending a more 
formal hearing.” Id. at 540 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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stay regulation, however, allows the INS to extinguish the result of any 
hearing that would have been available to Kim as well as any other 
decision to release an alien.246  Therefore, Hyung Joon Kim leaves this 
automatic stay rule highly susceptible to attack.247 
3.  Terrorist Alien Provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act 
In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress 
passed the USA PATRIOT Act, which included further provisions for 
the detention of aliens.248  In particular, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1226a provides 
that the Attorney General “may certify an alien . . . if the Attorney 
General has reasonable grounds to believe” that the alien meets specified 
 
 246. E.g., Bezmen v. Ashcroft, 245 F.Supp.2d 446, 449, 451 (D. Conn., 2003) (dissolving an 
automatic stay because “it allows the INS to unilaterally override a decision of an IJ” results in 
indefinite detention). 
 247. E.g., Zavala v. Ridge, 310 F.Supp.2d 1071 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (vacating an automatic stay 
because they can be indefinite and there is no special justification for them in light of the fact that an 
immigration judge has already determined that the alien is not a danger to the public or a significant 
flight risk); Bezmen, 245 F.Supp.2d at 451 (dissolving an automatic stay because the goals of the 
interim detention are not served beause Bezmen was not deemed a threat by the INS.); Ashley v. 
Ridge, 288 F.Supp.2d 662, 675 (D. N.J. 2003) (holding that “detention of Petitioner without judicial 
review of the automatic stay of the bail determination, despite the Immigration Judge’s decision that 
he be released on bond, violates Petitioner’s procedural and substantive due process constitutional 
rights”).  After the INS (Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement) detained Milton Ashley 
on August 6, 2003, an Immigration Judge (IJ) determined that he should be released on bond.  
Ashley, 288 F.Supp.2d. at 664.  The INS immediately filed a notice of intent to appeal this 
determination, which automatically stayed the IJ’s decision.  Id.  Ashley filed a writ of habeas 
corpus.  Id.  The court noted that, while the Executive may have plenary power over substantive 
immigration issues, no deference is required for “the means the government has chosen to exercise 
that plenary power.  Id. (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001); INS v. Chadha, 462 
U.S. 919, 940-41 (1983)).  Because the court found that Ashley had a fundamental liberty interest 
implicated, it reasoned that strict scrutiny should apply.  Id. at 668.  It also concluded that 
“government detention violates the Due Process Clause unless it is ordered in a criminal proceeding 
with adequate procedural protections, or in non-punitive circumstances where a special justification 
outweighs the individual’s constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint.  Ashley, 
288 F.Supp.2d at 668 (quoting Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001)).  Because the IJ had 
already determined that Ashley should be released on bond, the court concluded “one cannot 
characterize [Ashley’s] continued confinement as anything but arbitrary.”  Id. at 669.  The court 
distinguished Hyung Joon Kim by pointing out that Ashley had taken advantage of the hearing that 
Kim had not and that the automatic stay provision gave no assurance that detention would last for 
only a brief period.  Id. at 672-73.  Further, the court reasoned that the automatic stay rule was 
contrary to congressional intent because it “effectively converts any alien detained pursuant to the 
discretionary detention provision of § 1226(a) into one held pursuant to the mandatory detention 
provision of § 1226(c).”  Id at 673. 
 248. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 412, 115, Stat. 272, 
350-52 (amending the Immigration and Nationality Act (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101 
et seq. (West. Supp. 2002)) by inserting § 236A, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1226a (West Supp. 2002)). 
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criteria249 and he “shall” take the alien into custody once he makes this 
certification.250  Unlike § 1226, however, § 1226a provides certain 
protections after certification.251 
The Attorney General must bring charges or otherwise begin 
deportation proceedings within seven days of detention or release the 
alien.252  Although § 1226a allows detention even when removal is 
unlikely in the reasonably foreseeable future, this detention is limited to 
“additional periods of up to six months only if the release of the alien 
will threaten the national security of the United States or the safety of 
the community or any person.”253  The Attorney General must review 
certification every six months and when the Attorney General decides 
that “certification should be revoked, the alien may be released.”254  
There is some conflicting language that requires the Attorney General, 
“irrespective of any relief from removal for which the alien may be 
eligible” to maintain custody as long as the above exceptions do not 
apply; however, the section also states that “if the alien is finally 
determined not to be removable, detention pursuant to this subsection 
shall terminate.”255 
Current case law suggests that detentions pursuant to § 1226a may 
easily become unconstitutional.256  The seven-day limit on beginning 
 
 249. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1226a (a)(3) (West Supp. 2002).  Aliens subject to certification include 
those who are engaged in, have been engaged in, or are seeking to enter the United States to engage 
in (a) a violation of  laws regarding espionage, sabotage, exporting goods, technology, or sensitive 
information; (b) the use of force, violence, or unlawful means to oppose, control, or overthrow the 
government; (c) terrorist activities; or (d) “any other activity that endangers the national security of 
the United States.”  8 U.S.C. § 1226a(a)(3) (West Supp. 2002).  See Cole, supra note 170, at 966-69 
(arguing that the USA PATRIOT Act “makes aliens deportable for wholly innocent association 
activity with a ‘terrorist organization,’ which interferes with their right of association). 
 250. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1226a (a)(1) (West Supp. 2002).  See Cole, supra note 170, at 970-72 
(suggesting that this provision will result in the detention of aliens who are neither a danger nor risk 
of flight and arguing that the INS has no legitimate basis to detain aliens for preventative detention 
before and after their removal determinations). 
 251. See Ascarrunz, supra note 5, at 79 (comparing USA PATRIOT Act detentions under 8 
U.S.C.A. § 1226a with criminal alien detentions under 8 U.S.C. § 1226). 
 252. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1226a (a)(3) (West Supp. 2002). 
 253. Id.  See Ascarrunz, supra note 5, at 108-09 (suggesting that, unlike the lack of individual 
determination of risk of flight or dangerousness in § 1226(a), the certification process of § 1226a is 
“necessarily individual”). 
 254. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1226a (a)(7) (West Supp. 2002).  This release may be subject to “such 
conditions as the Attorney General deems appropriate.”  Id.  See Ascarrunz, supra note 5, at 109-11 
(arguing that there are significantly more procedural safeguards in § 1226a such that they are not 
even mandatory and are “sufficiently narrowly tailored”).  But see Cole, supra note 170, at 972 
(reasoning that, even with these provisions, it appears that the INS may detain “aliens indefinitely, 
even where they have prevailed in their removal proceedings”). 
 255. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1226a (a)(2) (West Supp. 2002). 
 256. See Shirin Sinnar, Note, Patriotic or Unconstitutional? The Mandatory Detention of 
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removal proceedings may eliminate the same concern regarding the 
length of pre-removal detention; however, the time between 
commencement of proceedings and disposition of the proceedings is not 
limited and therefore is still a concern.257  Further, because it seems that 
the Attorney General may renew detentions in six-month increments 
with no maximum limit, the same post-removal concerns the Court 
addressed in Zadvydas v. Davis remain an issue.258  The Court in 
Zadvydas found detention after removal hearings unconstitutional when 
removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, although it allowed for a 
presumption of constitutionality for up to six months.259 
The general rule which Zadvydas reaffirmed was that detention is 
unconstitutional when the “detention longer bears a reasonable relation 
to the purpose for which the individual was committed.”260  If the 
government argues that the purpose of the detention is both to be able to 
execute removal orders and to protect against terrorism, it may transform 
the detention from a civil proceeding to punishment.261  However, the 
Court in Zadvydas explicitly left open the question of preventative 
detention in the context of terrorism.262 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Although mandatory detention is a poor policy decision, wasting 
resources on individuals who do not need detained and weakening our 
 
Aliens Under the USA Patriot Act, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1419 (2003) (arguing that § 1226a is 
unconstitutional but suspecting that courts will take a different approach due to terrorism). 
 257. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. at 540 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  See also Kathleen 
O’Rourke, Deportability, Detention and Due Process: An Analysis of Recent Tenth Circuit 
Decisions in Immigration Law, 79 DENV. U.L. REV. 353, 376-77 (2002) (questioning “[w]hether the 
seven-day limit . . . will place any actual restraints on the government’s treatment of immigrants”). 
 258. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1226a (a)(6) (West Supp. 2002).  The alien “may be detained for additional 
periods of up to six months.”  Id.  This would seem to limit detention to a total of six months were it 
not for a subsequent portion of § 1226a, which states that “[t]he alien may request each 6 months in 
writing that the Attorney General reconsider the certification.”  8 U.S.C.A. § 1226a (a)(7) (West 
Supp. 2002).  This would seem to indicate that Congress intended for the additional periods to be up 
to six months each rather than for the periods to be limited to six months total. 
 259. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 699, 701 (2001).  See supra notes 70-72 and 
accompanying text (discussing the Zadvydas decision). 
 260. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (quoting Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738, (1972)). 
 261. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 344, 361-62 (1997) (discussing distinctions 
between criminal and civil proceedings); supra note 31 (discussing the distinction between 
regulatory and penal actions). 
 262. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 696.  “Neither do we consider terrorism or other special 
circumstances where special arguments might be made for forms of preventative detention and for 
heightened deference to the judgments of the political branches with respect to matters of national 
security.”  Id. 
44
Akron Law Review, Vol. 38 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 7
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol38/iss1/7
SMITH.DOC 12/17/2004  12:13 PM 
2005] CHARLES DEMORE V. HYUNG JOON KIM 251 
arguments when other countries detain our citizens, it does not appear to 
be a priority for any of the political parties and they are not likely to 
address the problem through legislation.263  The judiciary could have 
served as a protectorate for non-citizens, but the Court’s analysis in 
Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim serves as an indicator that this minority may 
be left without recourse to protect their fundamental rights.264  To reach 
this end, the Supreme Court had to use a strained due process analysis to 
find such detentions constitutional rather than pointing out that the text 
of the Fifth Amendment is not limited to citizens and the Framers 
expressed their concerns with detaining innocent people with the 
Suspension Clause.265  Instead, the Court blurred the distinction between 
equal protection analysis and due process analysis and gave little 
consideration to the means chosen by Congress when it infringed on this 
minority’s fundamental right of liberty.266  Leaving us without an 
explanation of how they rationalized away strict scrutiny or an 
identification of what standard they applied, the Court has left it to 
future courts to struggle with these questions as they address ever-
 
 263. See O’Rourke, supra note 257, at 376-77 (arguing that mandatory detention without an 
individualized determination is of suspect constitutionality, but is also a drain on INS resources).  
See also Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary for George W. Bush, Fact Sheet: Fair and 
Secure Immigration Reform (Jan. 7, 2004), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
news/releases/2004/01/print/20040107-1.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2004) (on file with author) 
(offering temporary worker status to illegal aliens as long as they pay a fee and return home after 
the work is completed, but not addressing mandatory detention); Natural Law Party, Additional 
Platform Issues, at http://natural-law.org/platform/addissues.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2004) (copy 
on file with author) (arguing that we should “disincentivize illegal immigration by enforcing our 
immigration laws and by working to improve economic conditions in neighboring countries”); 
Michael Tanner, Libertarian Party, The Benefits of Open Immigration, at 
http://www.lp.org/issues/immigration.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2004) (on file with author) (arguing 
for increased immigration as long as aliens don’t use government benefits, but raising a concern 
with threats to their civil liberties); Reform Party USA, RPUSA Issues Committee Final Report 
(Oct. 10, 2003), at http://issues.reformparty.org/documents/2003platform_amendments.html (last 
visited Mar. 28, 2004) (copy on file with author) (arguing for dramatically decreased immigration 
and for “[t]he United States Government [to] automatically expel any immigrant found to be 
illegal).  But cf. Democratic National Committee, The 2000 Democratic National Platform: 
Prosperity, Progress, and Peace (Aug. 8, 2000), at http://www.democrats.org/about/ 
2000platform.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2004) (copy on file with author) (addressing primarily 
illegal immigration, but promising to enhance due process protections for legal immigrants). 
 264. See supra notes 132-142 and accompanying text (reviewing the Court’s reasoning that led 
it away from strict scrutiny). 
 265. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. (establishing the Suspension Clause); U.S. CONST. 
amend. V. (stating explicitly  that “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law”); see supra notes 168-196 and accompanying text (analyzing the 
Court’s due process analysis in Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim). 
 266. See supra notes 185-196 and accompanying text (focusing on the Court’s decision to 
bypass the narrowly tailored requirement of strict scrutiny in Hyung Joon Kim). 
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expanding attempts to target aliens in our post-September 11 world.267 
Brian Smith 
 
 267. See supra notes 227-262 and accompanying text (discussing post September 11 attempts 
to increase detentions power over aliens). 
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